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IMPROVING RETIREMENT SAVINGS OPTIONS FOR
EMPLOYEES
James Kwak



Americans do not save enough for retirement. One reason is that our
retirement savings accounts—whether employer-sponsored definedcontribution plans such as 401(k) plans or individual retirement accounts—
are heavily invested in actively managed mutual funds that siphon off tens
of billions of dollars in fees every year, yet deliver returns that trail the
overall market. Under existing law, as interpreted by the courts, mutual
funds may charge high fees to investors, and companies may offer
expensive, active funds to their employees. This Article argues that the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act should be reinterpreted, in light
of basic principles of trust investment law and the underlying purpose of
the statute, to strongly encourage employers to offer low-cost index funds
in their pension plans. Existing Department of Labor regulations should be
modified to clarify that the current safe harbor for participant-directed
plans (in which participants select among investment options chosen by
plan administrators) does not extend to plans that include expensive,
actively managed funds. This would improve the investment options
available to American workers and increase their chances of generating
sufficient income in retirement.
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INTRODUCTION
America faces a looming retirement security crisis. Social Security
Old-Age and Survivors Insurance, which has traditionally provided a basic
stream of income to retired workers, is threatened both by the projected
exhaustion of the Social Security trust funds (currently forecast for 2036),1
and by the resulting calls from both Republicans and Democrats to reduce
program benefits.2
Traditional defined benefit pensions, in which
1. THE BD. OF TRS., FED. OLD-AGE & SURVIVORS INS. & FED. DISABILITY INS. TRUST
FUNDS ANN. REP. 3 (2011), available at http://www.ssa.gov/oact/tr/2011/tr2011.pdf.
Technically speaking, there are two separate Social Security trust funds, but it is
conventional to analyze them in the aggregate. Once the trust funds are exhausted, benefit
payments will be limited to incoming payroll taxes, which will be insufficient to pay full
scheduled benefits.
2. The bipartisan deficit commission formed by President Barack Obama in 2010, for
example, recommended reducing the Social Security benefit formula for all but the lowestincome participants, increasing the full retirement age, and reducing cost-of-living
adjustments. NAT’L COMM’N ON FISCAL RESPONSIBILITY & REFORM, THE MOMENT OF
TRUTH 49–52 (2010), available at http://www.fiscalcommission.gov/sites/fiscalcommission.
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employers promise their employees a guaranteed annual income in
retirement, have largely made way for defined contribution pensions such
as 401(k) plans, in which employees are responsible for setting aside
money and investing it for retirement, generally choosing from a list of
investment options selected by the employer.3 In 2009, however, of all
households with a head of household between the ages of 57 and 66, only
63% had any retirement accounts–and the median value of those accounts
was less than $86,000.4 Rising health care costs disproportionately affect
the elderly because of their high consumption of health care and the
significant cost sharing imposed by Medicare, and Medicare’s increasingly
precarious financial straits make it highly likely that tomorrow’s retirees
will face some combination of higher premiums and lower benefits.5
Accumulating enough money for retirement boils down to three
things: putting aside money from your current income, generating
investment returns from that money, and not dipping into your retirement
savings prematurely. This Article focuses on the second element of this
formula. A fundamental problem for many Americans is that they simply
do not have good investment alternatives available in the employersponsored defined contribution plans that are their primary retirement
savings vehicle. Decades of research have shown that, when investing in
relatively liquid and efficient markets such as the U.S. stock market, most
people are better off putting their money in low-cost index mutual funds,
which attempt to track the overall market or a major market segment, rather
gov/files/documents/TheMomentofTruth12_1_2010.pdf (proposing Social Security reform);
see also BIPARTISAN POL’Y CTR. DEBT REDUCTION TASK FORCE, RESTORING AMERICA’S
FUTURE: REVIVING THE ECONOMY, CUTTING SPENDING AND DEBT, AND CREATING A SIMPLE,
PRO-GROWTH TAX SYSTEM 75–78 (2010), available at http://bipartisanpolicy.org/library/rep
ort/restoring-americas-future (recommending lower benefits for higher-income
beneficiaries, indexing the benefit formula to longevity, and changing the index used for
cost-of-living adjustments).
3. The specific investment options may be selected by a separate plan administrator,
but that administrator is itself selected by the employer.
4. Jesse Bricker et al., Surveying the Aftermath of the Storm: Changes in Family
Finances from 2007 to 2009 (Fed. Reserve Bd., Divs. of Research & Statistics & Monetary
Affairs, Working Paper No. 17, 2011) app. tbl.2A-B, available at http://www.federalreserv
e.gov/econresdata/scf/scf_2009p.htm.
5. President Obama’s 2010 deficit commission, for example, recommended limiting
growth in federal government health care spending to the rate of GDP growth plus one
percentage point, which is well below historical and current increases in health care
spending due to demographic changes and rising health care costs. NAT’L COMM’N ON
FISCAL RESPONSIBILITY & REFORM, supra note 2, at 41–42; see also BIPARTISAN POL’Y CTR.
DEBT REDUCTION TASK FORCE, supra note 2, at 51, 55–56 (recommending an increase in
Medicare Part B premiums and shifting Medicare to a premium support model where
growth in government spending is capped at the rate of GDP growth plus one percentage
point).
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than in more expensive, actively managed mutual funds, which attempt to
beat the market by betting on particular stocks or groups of stocks. Yet
many companies offer active funds in their 401(k) plans, and as of 2009,
the average stock fund in a 401(k) plan had an expense ratio of 74 basis
points, meaning that investors paid 0.74% of their assets every year for the
privilege of investing in that fund,6 while major domestic stock index funds
are available for as little as six basis points.7 In addition, active funds tend
to underperform the market, so their investors’ retirement savings are
eroded by lower gross returns (before expenses) as well as by higher fees.
The problems of high mutual fund fees and poor fund selection are not
new, but the traditional “solutions” have so far proven ineffective. Mutual
funds are regulated by the Investment Company Act of 1940 (1940 Act),8
which Congress amended in 1970 to impose on fund advisers (the
companies that collect fees for managing mutual funds’ money) “a
fiduciary duty with respect to the receipt of compensation for services.” 9
The courts have historically held that this requirement is met by any fee
that is roughly consistent with industry practice, a position that was
reaffirmed by the Supreme Court in 2010 in Jones v. Harris Associates
L.P., and that essentially blesses the status quo.10 Employer-sponsored
pension plans are regulated by the Employee Retirement Income Security
Act (ERISA), which imposes various fiduciary duties on the trustees and
administrators of those plans.11 In exchange, employer-sponsored plans
enjoy important tax preferences that help companies attract and retain
workers. Although plan participants and beneficiaries can sue their
employers for breach of those duties,12 the courts have so far declined to
hold that plan fiduciaries, including the plan’s administrators, trustee, and

6. INV. CO. INST., 2011 INVESTMENT COMPANY FACT BOOK: A REVIEW OF TRENDS AND
ACTIVITY IN THE INVESTMENT COMPANY INDUSTRY 110 (51st ed. 2011), available at
http://www.ici.org/pdf/2011_factbook.pdf. This is an asset-weighted average, meaning that
the expense ratio for each fund is weighted by the number of dollars invested in that fund.
7. As of late 2012, the Vanguard Total Stock Market Index Fund had an expense ratio
of six basis points for investments of at least $10,000. Vanguard Total Stock Market Index
Fund Admiral Shares, VANGUARD GROUP, INC., https://personal.vanguard.com/us/funds/sna
pshot?FundId=0585&FundIntExt=INT (last visited Jan. 31, 2013).
8. Investment Company Act of 1940, 14 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1 to -64 (2006).
9. 14 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1 to -64, amended by 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35(b) (1970).
10. Jones v. Harris Assocs. L.P., 130 S. Ct. 1418, 1426 (2010).
11. Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (1974) (codified as amended in 29 U.S.C. §§
1001–1461 & scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.); 29 U.S.C. §§ 1101–1114 (2006) (containing
fiduciary duty provisions of ERISA §§ 401–414).
12. “Participants” are employees or former employees who are eligible for or may
become eligible for benefits because of their employment and “beneficiaries” are other
people who are or may become eligible for benefits, typically because they have been
designated by participants.
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investment managers,13 have a duty to protect participants from the higher
costs and typically lower returns of active funds. The courts generally rely
on ERISA section 404(c), which protects fiduciaries from liability for
losses incurred as a result of participants’ own investment decisions.14
In this Article, I make a new legal argument for strongly encouraging
employer-sponsored defined contribution plans to offer only index funds
(for market segments where low-cost indexing is available). ERISA, by
construction and according to the interpretation of the Supreme Court,
explicitly incorporates the principles of trust law. The core principles of
trust investment law, as codified in the Restatement (Third) of Trusts—
including the duty of diversification, the duty to avoid unreasonable costs,
and the duty to avoid imprudent delegation—establish a presumption in
favor of passive (index) investing and against active investing, at least in
market segments that are relatively liquid and efficient. The key question
is what this presumption implies for a situation where plan participants are
allowed to exercise control over their accounts—control explicitly
endorsed by ERISA. I argue that plan fiduciaries’ duty to protect
participants from poor investment choices does not simply evaporate in this
context. Instead, while fiduciaries should offer a set of investment options
that enable participants to tailor their portfolios to their individual riskreturn preferences, the core duties of diversifying investments, avoiding
unreasonable costs, and avoiding imprudent delegation, still apply where
participants select from an array of investment options, and the duties still
establish a presumption against active funds.
This argument is based on existing law, and a court that agrees with
the argument could already hold that the inclusion of expensive, actively
managed funds in an employer pension plan constitutes a breach of
fiduciary duty. In defending against such claims, employers typically point
to regulations written by the Department of Labor (as authorized by
ERISA section 404(c)) that determine when plan fiduciaries are shielded
from liability for losses caused by the participant’s exercise of control.
Those regulations can be satisfied by a plan that includes expensive active

13. In general,
a person is a fiduciary with respect to a plan to the extent (i) he exercises any
discretionary authority or discretionary control respecting management of such
plan or exercises any authority or control respecting management or disposition
of its assets, (ii) he renders investment advice for a fee or other compensation,
direct or indirect, with respect to any moneys or other property of such plan, or
has any authority or responsibility to do so, or (iii) he has any discretionary
authority or discretionary responsibility in the administration of such plan.
§ 3(21)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A) (2012).
14. § 404(c), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(c) (2006).
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funds, but they admit two possible interpretations. The Department of
Labor claims that this safe harbor only covers liability for bad investment
decisions made by participants, not liability for poor selection of
investment options in the first place. The courts have split on this question,
with some holding that compliance with the regulations protects plan
fiduciaries from both forms of liability.
To clarify this situation, the regulations should be modified in light of
the interpretation of ERISA summarized above. The safe harbor provided
by section 404(c) should be restricted to retirement plans that include only
index funds. Plans including active funds would not necessarily violate
ERISA-imposed fiduciary duties but would not benefit from the automatic
safe harbor and would be susceptible to judicial review on a case-by-case
basis. This would be more consistent with the principles of trust law as
applied to ERISA and, most importantly, would improve the set of
investment options available to workers in their retirement plans. A more
modest alternative that could still have significant practical benefits would
be granting the section 404(c) safe harbor to plans that make index funds
the default investment allocation for plan participants but allow participants
to opt into active funds. While this is far from a complete solution to our
country’s retirement security challenges, it would at least remove one
significant drain on families’ retirement accounts.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I describes the policy problem:
the importance of mutual funds to the overall retirement landscape, the
superiority of index funds to active funds for ordinary investors, and the
prevalence of active funds in the overall market and in retirement accounts.
Part II surveys the historical attempts to prevent mutual funds from
charging high fees and to encourage employers to offer good funds to their
employees. Part III lays out the central argument of this Article—that the
core principles of trust investment law, as applied to ERISA, establish a
strong presumption against including active funds in employer-sponsored
plans—and describes how this presumption could be implemented. Part IV
addresses the relationship of public policy to legal doctrine and discusses
whether the proposals in this Article are either too radical (not sufficiently
supported by legal doctrine) or too modest (insufficient to solve the overall
policy problem). Part V concludes by situating the Article’s proposals
within the history of America’s public-private retirement system.
I. THE PROBLEM
A. The Retirement Security Challenge
Many Americans face the ominous prospect of not having enough
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money to live on in their old age.15 Historically, retirees have depended on
three main sources of income: Social Security, private pensions, and
individual savings. Social Security is a pay-as-you-go system in which a
payroll tax, levied on most wage earners and their employers, funds
annuitized benefits paid to current and future retirees. Private pensions are
tax-advantaged retirement plans created by private or public organizations
in which employees or their employers set aside money that will ostensibly
be used to provide income to those employees in retirement.16 In this
Article, “pensions” refers to both defined benefit and defined contribution
plans. Individual savings are additional funds that people set aside for
retirement, often through various types of Individual Retirement Accounts
(IRAs), which also enjoy tax preferences.
Social Security currently promises modest benefits even to people
who are now relatively young,17 but whether the Social Security
Administration will be able to pay those benefits is another question. In
2009, for the first time, the payroll taxes that finance Social Security were
insufficient to pay current benefits, forcing the programs to draw on their
accumulated trust funds.18 As the baby boom generation retires, the
imbalance between tax revenues and benefit payments will only get worse,
leading to the exhaustion of the trust funds around 2036.19 After that point,
Social Security will only be able to pay about 77% of the benefits
scheduled under current law.20 This funding gap has created political
pressure for a solution that will likely include a reduction in benefits to
retirees.21 In addition, Medicare—the federal program on which most
retirees depend for health insurance—is in shakier financial condition, with
spending projected to grow from 3.7% of GDP in 2011 to 6.7% of GDP in

15. See, e.g., Stephen F. Befort, The Perfect Storm of Retirement Insecurity: Fixing the
Three-Legged Stool of Social Security, Pensions, and Personal Savings, 91 MINN. L. REV.
938, 940–62 (2007) (anticipating, in 2007, a “perfect storm” caused by longer life
expectancies and current workers not saving enough for retirement, threatening future
retirees’ financial well-being).
16. I say “ostensibly” because many such plans today allow participants to withdraw
money before retirement.
17. E.g., Andrew G. Biggs & Glenn R. Springstead, Alternate Measures of
Replacement Rates for Social Security Benefits and Retirement Income, 68 SOC. SEC. BULL.
(No. 2) 8, 14 (2008) (noting, in 2008, that a middle-income worker who is currently in her
late thirties and retires in 2040 at age sixty-five could expect to receive benefits equal to
fifty-five percent of her average income for the five years prior to retirement).
18. THE BD. OF TRS., supra note 1, at 42 (explaining that the Social Security trust funds
invest surpluses earned in prior years and use those surpluses, as well as accumulated
interest, to compensate for shortfalls in current and future years).
19. Id. at 3.
20. Id. at 9.
21. See supra note 2.
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2035.22 This has created the widespread belief that something must be
done about Medicare: That something is likely to be either a reduction in
benefits, which would increase costs for retirees, or the conversion of
Medicare to a voucher program, which would increase costs for retirees
and transfer the risk of health care cost inflation from the federal
government to retirees.23
These likely reductions in already-modest government programs make
private pensions and individual savings increasingly important components
of retirement security. Yet American households today seem singularly
unprepared for retirement. As of 2009, only 14% of middle-income
households held any stocks, only 14% held any bonds (including savings
bonds), and only 7% held any investment funds, including mutual funds
(outside of retirement accounts).24 Of middle-income households, only
58% had retirement accounts, and the median value of those accounts was
only $26,000.25 Even for households (of all incomes) headed by someone
between the ages of 57 and 66, only 63% held any retirement accounts,
with a median value of less than $86,000.26
The most important factor affecting a person’s retirement assets is
probably the amount she saves while working. But another important
factor is how she invests that money. In the first decades after World War
II, employer-sponsored pensions primarily followed the defined benefit
model, where the employer promised to pay the employee a specific annual
benefit upon retirement. The employer invested assets in the current period
to fund those future benefits and bore the resulting investment risk. The
past half-century, however, has seen a major shift from defined benefit to
defined contribution pensions.27 In the latter, the employer or the employee
puts a specific amount of money in an individual account in the current
period, and the employee receives that money (with investment gains) upon
retirement. As a result, the employee bears the investment risk, not the
employer.
It is theoretically possible for a defined contribution pension plan to be
managed by the employer or by a professional investment adviser, but in
22. The 6.7% figure is from the “alternative fiscal scenario,” which incorporates likely
changes to current law. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, CBO’S 2011 LONG-TERM BUDGET OUTLOOK
8 (2011).
23. See supra note 5.
24. Bricker et al., supra note 4, app. tbl.2A.
25. Bricker et al., supra note 4, app. tbl.2A-B.
26. Bricker et al., supra note 4, app. tbl.2A-B.
27. See Edward A. Zelinsky, The Defined Contribution Paradigm, 114 YALE L.J. 451,
470 (2004) (noting that both the number of defined benefit plans and the number of
participants in these plans have declined while the number of defined contribution plans has
grown, signaling a “reversal of historic patterns”).
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practice most such plans are “participant-directed,” meaning that the
employee can choose from a list of investment options. The growth of the
defined contribution plan has been accompanied by the growth of IRAs,
which were created by ERISA to make pension benefits portable.28 Instead
of having to take a taxable distribution of her pension benefits upon leaving
an employer, a departing employee could roll her distribution into an IRA,
which would continue to generate tax-free investment returns until
retirement. Current law also allows people who are not participants in
employer-sponsored retirement plans to contribute pre-tax money to IRAs,
thereby receiving the same tax benefits as those provided by defined
contribution plans.29
In 2010, American households had $4.5 trillion invested in employersponsored defined contribution plans and $4.7 trillion in IRAs. 30 The large
and growing importance of these plans means that an individual’s
retirement income increasingly depends in part on her investment choices.
And today, more money in retirement accounts is invested in mutual funds
than in any other investment vehicle—often, in the case of employersponsored plans, because employees have no other viable investment
options.31
B. The Importance of Mutual Funds
In general, a mutual fund is a legal entity, organized either as a
corporation or as a business trust, with the sole function of investing in
other assets.32 The fund issues shares that are bought by fund investors and
that investors can sell back to the fund. Each share is a proportional claim
on the assets in the fund and is priced based on the fund’s net asset value;
that is, fund shares never trade at a discount or a premium to the assets held
by the fund. The assets of the fund are managed by the fund adviser, a
company external to the fund itself, which is paid directly by the fund for
its services. In other words, buying shares in a mutual fund is a way of
hiring someone else to manage your money.
28. 26 U.S.C. §§ 402, 408 (2006) (amending the Internal Revenue Code); see Zelinsky,
supra note 27, at 472–75, (discussing the creation of the IRA).
29. There are other flavors of tax-advantaged retirement savings, such as nondeductible (after-tax) IRAs and Roth IRAs.
30. INV. CO. INST., supra note 6, at 101.
31. INV. CO. INST., supra note 6, at 112; see also INV. CO. INST., 2010 INVESTMENT
COMPANY FACT BOOK: A REVIEW OF TRENDS AND ACTIVITIES IN THE INVESTMENT COMPANY
INDUSTRY 103 (50th ed. 2010), available at http://www.ici.org/pdf/2010_factbook.pdf.
32. See Sheldon A. Jones et al., The Massachusetts Business Trust and Registered
Investment Companies, 13 DEL. J. CORP. L. 421 (1988) (discussing the legal structure of
mutual funds).
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On balance, the existence of mutual funds is probably a good thing.
Without mutual funds, people who wanted to invest in securities would be
forced to buy individual stocks and bonds, incurring transaction and search
costs. To obtain the benefits of diversification, they would have to buy
large numbers of securities, which would be particularly inconvenient for
small investors. Instead, an individual investor today can buy a small
number of mutual funds or a single fund that provides a high degree of
diversification at relatively low cost, making investing both simpler and
cheaper. Mutual funds effectively allow small investors to pool their
money and thereby gain some of the advantages of large investors.
Mutual funds are convenient and widely used, currently holding $11.8
trillion in investments in the United States.33 They are also the building
blocks out of which much of our country’s retirement “system” is built.
While Social Security does not invest in mutual funds, both defined
contribution pensions and individual savings largely take the form of
mutual fund investments. Mutual funds make up the largest single portion
of the IRA market, with $2.2 trillion out of the total $4.7 trillion market.34
And because mutual funds are the most popular investment options
included in defined contribution pension plans, they claim $2.5 trillion of
the $4.7 trillion in those plans.35 For most households, a majority of their
financial assets are invested in mutual funds,36 and for 74% of households,
retirement saving is the primary goal of their mutual fund investments.37
The prevalence of mutual funds means that individuals’ investment
outcomes–and their retirement security–are largely in the hands of the
mutual fund industry.
C. Good and Bad Funds
The biggest threat to investors posed by mutual funds is the expenses
associated with actively managed funds.38 Because a mutual fund is an

33. INV. CO. INST., supra note 6, at 9 (referring to “open-ended” mutual funds, which
allow investors to redeem their shares at net asset value).
34. INV. CO. INST., supra note 6, at 112.
35. INV. CO. INST., supra note 6, at 118.
36. Characteristics of Mutual Funds Investors, 2010, 19 RES. FUNDAMENTALS (Inv. Co.
Inst., Washington, D.C.), Sept. 2010, at 5.
37. Id. at 7.
38. Mutual funds have also made headlines for illegal behavior, including late trading
(allowing certain clients to place orders after the day’s closing price has been calculated)
and market timing (allowing certain clients to make frequent trades even in violation of a
fund’s official disclosure documents). See, e.g., William A. Birdthistle, Investment
Indiscipline: A Behavioral Approach to Mutual Fund Jurisprudence, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV.
61, 75–78 (2010) (presenting multiple ways in which investment advisors might take
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investment vehicle, the main characteristic customers should care about is
the net investment returns that they will receive. Net investment returns
equal gross investment returns (performance of the fund’s investments)
minus expenses (including sales loads, fund management fees, and
administrative fees). Mutual funds can be divided into two categories:
passively managed (index) funds and actively managed funds. Index funds
attempt to replicate the performance of a market index, such as the S&P
500, sometimes simply by buying all the securities that make up the index.
Therefore, they generally deliver gross investment returns that are very
close to those of the market segment tracked by the index, and they usually
have low expenses. In an active fund, the fund manager makes decisions to
buy and sell securities with the intention of beating the market. Active
funds generally have higher expenses than index funds for at least three
reasons: higher costs of active stock-picking, the ability to charge higher
prices because they offer a more differentiated product (stock-picking
expertise), and higher transaction costs due to more frequent buying and
selling.39
The attraction of actively managed funds is that they hold out the
promise of beating the market. After all, if some fund manager is smart
enough to beat the market by five percentage points per year, then it makes
sense to pay one percentage point more in expenses to obtain her services.
The problem is that there are very few, if any, fund managers smart enough
to consistently beat the market in a meaningful sense—that is, managers
whose expected gross returns, on a risk-adjusted basis,40 are higher not only
than those of an index fund, but high enough to compensate for higher
costs. And since funds disclose their past returns, not their expected
returns (which can be difficult to calculate with any accuracy), it is very
hard, if not impossible, to identify those fund managers in advance. A
large majority of investors would be better off simply buying index funds,
pocketing the market return, and saving the expenses.
The superiority of index funds over active funds for the ordinary

advantage of the current trading system); Thomas R. Hurst, The Unfinished Business of
Mutual Fund Reform, 26 PACE L. REV. 133 (2005) (detailing the evolution of the mutual
fund industry and unscrupulous actions taken by those in the field); Martin E. Lybecker,
Enhanced Corporate Governance for Mutual Funds: A Flawed Concept That Deserves
Serious Reconsideration, 83 WASH. U. L.Q. 1045, 1061–79 (2005) (highlighting specific
scandals among mutual fund groups during from 2003 to 2004).
39. Technically, transaction costs are already included in a fund’s gross investment
return (before deductions for fund expenses), so a fund’s published expense ratio does not
capture the full costs of active management; in some cases, transaction costs can exceed a
fund’s published expense ratios. See Hurst, supra note 38, at 146–47.
40. In general, asset classes with higher risk (higher variance of outcomes) have higher
returns, so one way to increase expected returns is simply to invest in riskier assets.
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investor is illustrated by the efficient market hypothesis—one of the central
propositions of modern finance theory—but does not actually depend on it.
That hypothesis, most closely associated with University of Chicago
economist Eugene Fama,41 holds, in short, that no one can beat the market.
The basic principle is simple: In a highly liquid market, where investors
can trade securities quickly and at low cost, prices will rapidly change to
incorporate all available relevant information. Otherwise, traders would be
able to make profits on new information, and their very activity would
bring prices into line with that information. If no one can beat the market
consistently, then there is no point in investing in active funds. Any fund
that attempts to beat the market is at least as likely to fail as to succeed, so
at best it will have the same expected gross returns as an index fund, but
with higher expenses. The performance of funds that do beat the market
year after year can be explained as the result of simple chance: In any
universe including thousands of funds, many will beat the market in a given
year, and some will beat the market for several years in succession.
The efficient market hypothesis is one of the most tested propositions
in modern finance. Recent research indicates that there are probably some
fund managers who can beat the market (that is, their superior results
cannot be explained simply as the product of random chance).42
Unfortunately, they are hard if not impossible to pick out from the legions
of fund managers out there. In general, according to Mark Carhart:
Persistence in mutual fund performance does not reflect superior
stock-picking skill. Rather, common factors in stock returns and
persistent differences in mutual fund expenses and transaction
costs explain almost all of the predictability in mutual fund
returns. Only the strong, persistent underperformance by the
worst-return mutual funds remains anomalous.43
Eugene Fama and Kenneth French acknowledge that some fund

41. Eugene F. Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical
Work, 25 J. FIN. 383 (1970); see also JOHN CASSIDY, HOW MARKETS FAIL: THE LOGIC OF
ECONOMIC CALAMITIES, 85–96 (2009) (examining the efficient market hypothesis through
historical examples); JUSTIN FOX, THE MYTH OF THE RATIONAL MARKET: A HISTORY OF
RISK, REWARD, AND DELUSION ON WALL STREET 89–107 (2009) (discussing Fama and the
efficient market hypothesis).
42. See, e.g., Mark M. Carhart, On Persistence in Mutual Fund Performance, 52 J. FIN.
57, 80 (1997) (finding “very slight evidence” of mutual fund manager skill); Robert
Kosowski et al., Can Mutual Fund “Stars” Really Pick Stocks? New Evidence from a
Bootstrap Analysis, 61 J. FIN. 2551 (2006) (finding that the top mutual funds in recent years
do have positive performance that persists at least one year into the future); Eugene F. Fama
& Kenneth R. French, Luck Versus Skill in the Cross-Section of Mutual Fund Returns, 65 J.
FIN. 1915 (2010) (finding that some managers have sufficient skill to cover their costs).
43. Carhart, supra note 42, at 57.
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managers have market-beating skill, but nevertheless find that “true [alpha]
in net returns to investors is negative for most if not all active funds . . . .”44
Significantly for ordinary investors, “if many managers have sufficient skill
to cover costs, they are hidden by the mass of managers with insufficient
skill.”45 Since the mid-1960s, many studies have shown that active funds,
in general, do worse than the market as a whole.46 As of mid-2010, a
majority of actively managed funds had lower returns than their relevant
benchmark indexes in every single fund category over one, three, and five
years.47 Even if the efficient market hypothesis is not strictly true, it is true
enough for the practical purposes of ordinary investors.
If stock-picking ability is impossible to identify, then the sole
determinant of fund returns that investors can control is expenses. For
those who think that stock picking is irrelevant, expenses are the main
determinant of performance.48 For those who believe in stock picking
ability, much, if not all of it, is absorbed by expenses.49 Even worse,
expenses are negatively correlated with gross returns, not just net returns;

44. Fama & French, supra note 42, at 1916. “Alpha” is the conventional designation
for returns that are due to fund manager skill, as opposed to beta, the designation for returns
that are due to the performance of the overall market.
45. Fama & French, supra note 42, at 1916.
46. E.g., William F. Sharpe, Mutual Fund Performance, 39 J. BUS. 119, 137 (1966)
(finding that a sample of stock mutual funds underperformed the Dow Jones Industrial
Average on a risk-adjusted basis); see also Javier Gil-Bazo & Pablo Ruiz-Verdú, The
Relation Between Price and Performance in the Mutual Fund Industry, 64 J. FIN. 2153
(2009) (finding underperformance of twenty-one to seventy-one basis points, depending on
the set of controls); Martin J. Gruber, Another Puzzle: The Growth in Actively Managed
Funds, 52 J. FIN. 783, 787 (1996) (finding that actively managed funds had annual returns
that were sixty-five basis points below the applicable market indexes); Michael C. Jensen,
Risk, the Pricing of Capital Assets, and the Evaluation of Investment Portfolios, 42 J. BUS.
167, 239 (1969) (finding that mutual funds, on a risk-adjusted basis, had lower net returns
than the market as a whole); Russ Wermers, Mutual Fund Performance: An Empirical
Decomposition into Stock-Picking Talent, Style, Transactions Costs, and Expenses, 55 J.
FIN. 1655 (2000) (finding that actively managed funds hold stocks that outperform the
market, but on a net basis underperform indexes by one percent). Note that both Gruber and
Wermers argue that some fund managers do have superior stock-picking ability, but still
recognize that funds as a whole do worse than the market.
47. Standard & Poor’s Indices Versus Active Funds Scorecard: Mid-Year 2010, S&P
INDICES: RESEARCH & DESIGN (S&P Indices, New York), 2010, at 3.
48. “In the absence of forecasting ability, all one need do is generate substantial
expenses through time to insure inferior performance.” Jensen, supra note 46, at 236; see
also Sharpe, supra note 46, at 137 (finding that mutual funds do about as well as the Dow
Jones index before expenses, but worse than the index after accounting for expenses).
49. Wermers, supra note 46, at 1690 (finding that expenses and transaction costs
outweigh stock picking ability); see also Fama & French, supra note 42, at 1931–34
(finding that many managers have skill sufficient to cover their transaction costs, but few
have skill sufficient to cover the other costs included in fund expense ratios).
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that is, higher expenses are more likely to buy you a bad fund manager.50
For the ordinary investor, then, the dominant strategy is simple: buy index
funds with low expenses.51
Yet investors continue to invest in expensive, actively managed funds.
Only 14.5% of stock mutual fund investments are in index funds.52 While
broad stock market index funds are available with expense ratios of 10
basis points or less,53 in 2010, the average stock mutual fund charged 145
basis points for its efforts to beat the market. Even when funds were
weighted by assets, the average stock mutual fund expense ratio was 84
basis points.54 The average mutual fund also charged a 1% up-front “sales
load,” which is a fee to invest in the fund.55 This boosted the effective
annual cost of the average stock fund to 95 basis points.56 People who buy
mutual funds through their employer pension plans do little better. As of
2009, the asset-weighted average expense ratio for 401(k) plan investments
in stock mutual funds was 74 basis points, while the comparable figure for
all stock mutual funds was 86 basis points.57 Given that asset-weighting
increases the importance of large 401(k) plans, which should be able to
exert the same influence on fund management fees as institutional
investors, an advantage of 12 basis points is only a paltry improvement. In
addition, investors in mutual funds receive returns that are considerably
worse than the returns of those funds themselves because they buy and sell
fund shares at the wrong time—buying into funds that have recently done
well and selling out of funds that have done poorly.58 From 1991 through
2010, investors in stock mutual funds earned an annual return of 3.83%,
while the S&P 500 Index returned 9.14% annually.59 Over that period,
50. Gil-Bazo & Ruiz-Verdú, supra note 46.
51. Although index funds should have lower expenses than actively managed funds,
some index funds charge much higher fees than others.
52. INV. CO. INST., supra note 6, at 33.
53. See Vanguard Total Stock Market Index Fund Admiral Shares, supra note 7.
54. INV. CO. INST., supra note 6, at 66.
55. INV. CO. INST., supra note 6, at 65.
56. INV. CO. INST., supra note 6, at 64.
57. INV. CO. INST., supra note 6, at 110. The asset-weighted average expense ratio for
stock funds was eighty-six basis points in 2009 and eighty-four basis points in 2010.
58. Christine Benz, How Did Investors Really Do?, MORNINGSTAR (Nov. 13, 2006,
6:00 AM), http://news.morningstar.com/articlenet/article.aspx?id=178504.
59. Press Release, Dalbar, Inc., Investors Can Manage Psyche to Capture Alpha:
Dalbar Study of Investor Returns Offers Ways to Improve Investor’s Alpha (Apr. 1, 2011),
http://www.dalbar.com/Portals/dalbar/cache/News/PressReleases/pressrelease040111.pdf.
After fund expenses, an investor in an S&P 500 index fund would have earned an annual
return of about 9%. The period from 1991–2010 was not an unusual one: For the 20 years
ending in 1998, the corresponding gap was 10.65%. Press Release, Dalbar, Inc., Investors
Regain Footing: Dalbar Study Finds That Market Experience and Target Date Funds Lead
to Success (Mar. 31, 2010), http://www.dalbar.com/Portals/dalbar/cache/News/PressRelease
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$10,000 invested in the S&P 500 Index would have grown to $137,885; the
same amount earning 3.83% per year would have grown to only $30,881.
Expensive, actively managed funds are a major threat to the retirement
security of millions of middle-class Americans.
People make bad decisions in general, particularly when it comes to
investing. The behavioral economics literature is replete with examples of
irrational investing choices.60 The idea that it is difficult, if not impossible,
to beat the market consistently is not intuitive; nor is the idea that repeated
positive results are most often due to chance. Perhaps most difficult to
accept is the idea that higher prices do not connote quality, but just the
opposite. As a result, investors tend to chase returns, buying asset classes
(e.g., stocks), certain types of funds (e.g., technology stock funds), and
specific funds based on their past performance—all strategies that tend to
have a negative impact on returns.
But we also have to ask who gains from the widespread belief that it is
possible to beat the market. “Why do Congress and the SEC perpetuate
these myths?” A.C. Pritchard asks. “Because the financial services
industry requires these myths for its very existence. If investors were to
switch en masse to index funds and other forms of passive investment, the
Wall Street-industrial complex would crumble.”61 Mutual fund companies
set out to exploit the human foibles that cause people to invest in active
funds. Because fund companies make more money from high-expense
funds than from low-expense funds, all other things being equal, they have
an obvious incentive to create and market high-expense funds. Fund
marketing centers on past performance. So, for example, a fund company
can quietly launch several similar funds and wait a few years, after which
some are likely (through luck if nothing else) to have beaten the market;62
then it can shut down the losers and actively market the winners to a
s/pressrelease20100331.pdf.
60. For brief reviews of the major findings, see Birdthistle, supra note 38, at 80–84;
Susan J. Stabile, Freedom to Choose Unwisely: Congress’ Misguided Decision to Leave
401(k) Plan Participants to Their Own Devices, 11 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 361, 378–81
(2002).
61. A.C. Pritchard, The SEC at 70: Time for Retirement?, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1073, 1089 (2005).
62. From 1995 to 1997, the Van Kampen Growth Fund was a small fund that was
closed to the public. It achieved stellar returns because its sponsor, Van Kampen Funds,
gave it allocations in thirty-one hot initial public offerings. Van Kampen Funds then began
marketing the Growth Fund to the public. Van Kampen Inv. Advisory Corp., Investment
Company Act Release No. 23,996, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 1819, 70 SEC
Docket 1213 (Sept. 8, 1999); see also Dreyfus Corp., Securities Act Release No. 7857,
Investment Company Act Release No. 24,450, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 1870,
72 SEC Docket 946 (May 10, 2000) (imposing sanctions on Dreyfus for failing to disclose
the “large impact of the IPOs on the fund’s performance”).
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largely unsuspecting public. Fund companies also advertise the track
records and pedigrees of their fund managers, using celebrity to attract
investors who believe that some people must be better at stock picking than
other people.
Although people make bad choices, perhaps we should allow them to
do so. On one theory, summarized by Judge Frank Easterbrook in the
Seventh Circuit’s opinion in Jones v. Harris Associates L.P., mutual funds
compete in a free market, so people can look out for their own interests and
we should let the chips fall where they may:
New entry is common, and funds can attract money only by
offering a combination of service and management that investors
value, at a price they are willing to pay. Mutual funds come
much closer to the model of atomistic competition than do most
other markets. . . . A recent, careful study concludes that
thousands of mutual funds are plenty, that investors can and do
protect their interests by shopping, and that regulating advisory
fees through litigation is unlikely to do more good than harm.63
According to Easterbrook, as long as there is sufficient competition,
consumers will only buy into a fund if it provides sufficient “service and
management.” Therefore, when investors overpay for active funds, they
are getting something for their money, even if it isn’t superior investment
returns. The study cited by Easterbrook is a 2007 article by John Coates
and Glenn Hubbard that similarly focused on the existence of competition:
Coates and Hubbard provided evidence that money tends to flow from
mutual funds with high expenses to funds with low expenses, which
implies that competition is working as it should.64
Even if we accept its premises, however, Easterbrook’s argument
constitutes a rather pallid defense of the status quo. He relies on the mere
existence of competition rather than defending its substantive outcome:
large investments in active funds with high fees. In their article, Coates
and Hubbard actually show that funds with lower expenses do have higher
63. Jones v. Harris Assocs. L.P., 527 F.3d 627, 634 (7th Cir. 2008), vacated and
remanded, 130 S. Ct. 1418 (2010); see also M. Todd Henderson, Justifying Jones, 77 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1027, 1035 (2010) (“The market for mutual funds is mature and competitive,
so it strains credulity to claim that advisers can get away with charging supracompetitive
fees, let alone to contend that courts are equipped to efficiently police abuses.”).
64. John C. Coates IV & R. Glenn Hubbard, Competition in the Mutual Fund Industry:
Evidence and Implications for Policy, 33 J. CORP. L. 151, 180–83 (2007). Coates and
Hubbard’s findings have been vigorously contested. See, e.g., John P. Freeman et al,
Mutual Fund Advisory Fees: New Evidence and a Fair Fiduciary Duty Test, 61 OKLA. L.
REV. 83 (2008) (“The current system for evaluating mutual fund advisory fees is a
failure. . . . [It has] allowed fund fees to float even higher, free from the competitive
market’s gravitational pull”).

KWAK - FINALIZED (DO NOT DELETE)

2013]

IMPROVING RETIREMENT SAVINGS

3/3/2013 1:09 PM

499

net returns, and this is, in fact, at the crux of their analysis: Cheaper funds
perform better, which is why they grow in size, which is what proves that
competition is working.65 But competition does not prove that a market is
efficient, let alone that it produces outcomes that are desirable either for
individuals or for society as a whole.66
The fact that, in a competitive market, some people make poor choices
that cause them to lose money may not in the abstract constitute a public
policy concern, and this Article does not address the issue of what mutual
funds people select for their taxable, non-retirement investments. When
poor decisions are made in a market that enjoys tax preferences precisely
because it is intended to further the public goal of expanding retirement
security, however, it does raise a significant policy question. By providing
valuable tax benefits to retirement accounts, the federal government is
effectively a co-investor in those accounts; it hopes to gain “returns” in the
form of lower poverty rates among elderly Americans. Even if some
people are able to pick mutual funds that do beat the market, whether
through luck or through skill, they are outnumbered by people whose fund
investments trail the market. In the aggregate, then, active funds constitute
a drain on Americans’ retirement savings. The question becomes even
more pressing in the context of employer-sponsored retirement plans,
where employees cannot access the free market directly, but are instead
restricted to the investment options prescribed by plan administrators.
II. SHORTCOMINGS OF EXISTING REGULATORY APPROACHES
The problem of high mutual fund fees is not new. This Part describes
the two main approaches through which Congress and plaintiffs’ attorneys

65. Coates & Hubbard, supra note 64, at 180.
66. Easterbrook also dismisses the argument that fund companies can prey on
unsophisticated consumers: “The sophisticated investors who do shop create a competitive
pressure that protects the rest.” Jones, 527 F.3d at 634 (citing Alan Schwartz & Louis L.
Wilde, Imperfect Information in Markets for Contract Terms: The Examples of Warranties
and Security Interests, 69 VA. L. REV. 1387 (1983)). Several economists, however, have
argued that sophisticated and unsophisticated investors essentially shop in different markets,
allowing fund companies to market expensive funds to the unsophisticated. See, e.g., Susan
E.K. Christoffersen & David K. Musto, Demand Curves and the Pricing of Money
Management, 15 REV. FIN. STUD. 1499 (2002) (finding that if a fund performed poorly, its
sophisticated investors would flee to other funds, leaving only price-insensitive customers
and allowing the fund to charge high prices); Gil-Bazo & Ruiz-Verdú, supra note 46
(finding evidence to support Christoffersen and Musto’s explanation and an alternative
explanation: fund companies create funds they know will have lower expected performance
and specifically target unsophisticated investors; Gruber, supra note 46, at 807 (arguing that
bad funds exist because they collect money from unsophisticated investors and people
restricted by their pension plans to underperforming funds).

KWAK - FINALIZED (DO NOT DELETE)

500

U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW

3/3/2013 1:09 PM

[Vol. 15:2

have attempted to protect investors from expensive funds—regulation of
mutual funds under the 1940 Act and of employer-sponsored pension plans
under ERISA—and explains why they have generally failed.
A. Mutual Fund Regulation
As its supporters like to point out, the mutual fund industry is highly
regulated.67 Mutual funds and their relationship with fund advisers are
subject to the 1940 Act and to the Investment Company Amendments Act
of 1970 (“1970 Amendments”), which placed additional fee-related
requirements on mutual funds.68 Current law, however, has proven
ineffective at limiting mutual fund expenses or driving bad funds from the
market.
The 1940 Act dictated a corporation-like governance structure for all
mutual funds, regardless of whether they were constituted as corporations
or trusts. Each fund has a board of directors that is elected by shareholders
(investors) in the fund; at least forty percent of those directors must be
“disinterested” parties.69 The board’s responsibilities include approving the
contract for investment services between the fund and the fund adviser.70
Section 17(h) of the 1940 Act makes directors liable to fund shareholders
for “willful misfeasance, bad faith, gross negligence or reckless disregard
of the duties involved . . . .”71 Section 36 of the Act, in its original version,
prohibited breaches of fiduciary duty involving “gross misconduct or gross
67. E.g., Coates & Hubbard, supra note 64, at 153 (arguing against additional
regulation of mutual funds, “already the most heavily regulated sector of the financial
services industry”). See generally Coates & Hubbard, supra note 64, at 160–63 (explaining
how law and regulation promote competition in the mutual fund industry); Jill E. Fisch,
Rethinking the Regulation of Securities Intermediaries, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 1961, 1967–83
(2010) (discussing the regulation of mutual funds, money market funds, exchange-traded
funds, and 401(k) plans); Donald C. Langevoort, Private Litigation to Enforce Fiduciary
Duties in Mutual Funds: Derivative Suits, Disinterested Directors and the Ideology of
Investor Sovereignty, 83 WASH. U. L.Q. 1017, 1019–25 (2005) (discussing litigation as a
remedy for fiduciary breaches by mutual fund directors); John Morley & Quinn Curtis,
Taking Exit Rights Seriously: Why Governance and Fee Litigation Don’t Work in Mutual
Funds, 120 YALE L.J. 84, 92–98 (2010) (summarizing the regulation of mutual funds).
68. Investment Company Act of 1940, Pub. L. No. 91-547, 84 Stat. 1413 (1970)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
69. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-10(a) (2006). In practice, certain SEC rules make it attractive for
mutual funds to have boards with a majority of disinterested members. Alan R. Palmiter,
The Mutual Fund Board: A Failed Experiment in Regulatory Outsourcing, 1 BROOK. J.
CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 165, 169 (2006).
70. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-15(c) (2006). The contract must be approved by a majority of the
disinterested directors. For a summary of directors’ duties in general, see Jones et al., supra
note 32, at 435–38.
71. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-17(h) (2006).
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abuse of trust”; this prohibition applied to fund advisers as well.72 The
1970 Amendments lowered the section 36 standard from “gross misconduct
or gross abuse of trust” to “personal misconduct.”73 The Amendments also
introduced section 36(b), which imposes on fund advisers “a fiduciary duty
with respect to the receipt of compensation for services” paid to the adviser
or any of its affiliates, backed by a private right of action.74 Approval of an
investment services agreement by the fund’s board of directors does not
automatically shield a fund adviser from liability.75
This all sounds good: The board should negotiate with the fund
adviser to ensure that the fund does not pay excessive fees, and the fund
adviser also has a fiduciary duty to the fund and its shareholders. The
structure set up by the 1940 Act, however, has not prevented the
domination of the fund industry by expensive mutual funds for two major
reasons. First, the corporate governance structure of mutual funds is deeply
flawed.76 In theory, the investment services contract must be approved at
least once by a majority of the shareholders.77 In practice, however, mutual
funds are created by the fund advisers themselves and hence the contract
can be approved before the fund is opened to the public; from that point it
only needs to be approved annually by the disinterested members of the
board.78 And because the fund adviser creates the fund in the first place,
the adviser is the only initial shareholder and can handpick the initial board.
The statutory definition of a “disinterested” director is weaker than the
common law definition of an independent director,79 and therefore
“disinterested” board members “are typically securities industry executives
and professionals whose firms provide direct or indirect services to mutual
funds.”80
Second, the standards for breach of the board’s or the fund adviser’s
fiduciary responsibilities have been set sufficiently high to protect mutual
funds from claims of excessive fees. From 1940 to 1970:
72. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35 (2006). For the original version of this section, see
Langevoort, supra note 67, at 1021.
73. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35(a) (2006).
74. Id. § 80a-35(b). Because section 36(b) only authorizes suits against an actual
“recipient of such compensation or payments,” it is targeted solely at fund advisers, not
directors. Id. § 80a-35(b)(3) (2006).
75. Id. § 80a-35(b)(2) (2006).
76. See, e.g., Palmiter, supra note 69, at 166 (explaining that the structure of the board
is flawed because it is “composed of part-timers” who “operate without meaningful
oversight”).
77. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-15(a) (2006).
78. Id. §§ 80a-15(a)(2), 80a-15(c).
79. Lyman Johnson, A Fresh Look at Director “Independence”: Mutual Fund Fee
Litigation and Gartenberg at Twenty-Five, 61 VAND. L. REV. 497 (2008).
80. Palmiter, supra note 69, at 170.
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[S]hareholders challenging investment adviser fees under state
law were required to meet “common-law standards of corporate
waste, under which an unreasonable or unfair fee might be
approved unless the court deemed it ‘unconscionable’ or
‘shocking,’” and “security holders challenging adviser fees under
the [Investment Company Act] itself had been required to prove
gross abuse of trust.”81
The prevalence of expensive mutual funds motivated Congress to pass
the 1970 Amendments.82 But despite Congress’s intentions, section 36(b)
has done little to deter excessive fees, which is not particularly surprising.
It is far from clear what it means that a fund adviser “shall be deemed to
have a fiduciary duty with respect to the receipt of compensation for
services,”83 nor is it obvious whether this new fiduciary duty has
substantive content or whether, as Easterbrook argued in Jones, it is simply
procedural.84 Because of these ambiguities, the application of section
36(b)–and hence the regulation of mutual fund fees—has rested largely in
the hands of the courts, which have never granted a final judgment to
plaintiffs under this section.85
Before the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Jones, the leading case
on section 36(b) was Gartenberg v. Merrill Lynch, a Second Circuit case
from 1982, which established a hurdle nearly as difficult for plaintiffs to
overcome as the one that predated the 1970 Amendments.86 The short
reading of Gartenberg is that it allows any mutual fund fee that is not “so
disproportionately large that it bears no reasonable relationship to the
services rendered and could not have been the product of arm’s-length
bargaining.”87 On its face, this test provides judicial cover for any fee that
is within shouting distance of industry averages, since a plaintiff must
prove both that the fee is unreasonably high and that it could not have been
negotiated fairly. As Donald Langevoort has written, “[t]his test resembles
the state law test for corporate waste, even though the legislative history

81. Jones v. Harris Assocs. L.P., 130 S.Ct. 1418, 1423 (2010) (alteration in original)
(quoting Daily Income Fund, Inc. v. Fox, 464 U.S. 523, 540 n.12 (1984)); see also Sarah
Cogan & Jonathan Youngwood, Determining Breach of Duty on Fees Charged by
Investment Advisers, 243 N.Y.L.J., Jun. 18, 2010, at 4 (discussing the Gartenberg standard).
82. Fisch, supra note 67, at 1972.
83. Jones v. Harris Assocs. L.P., 527 F.3d 627, 630 (7th Cir. 2008), vacated, 130 S. Ct.
1418 (2010) (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 80a-36(b) (2006)).
84. Justice Alito deemed the meaning of section 36(b) “hardly pellucid.” Jones, 130
S.Ct. at 1426.
85. Henderson, supra note 63, at 1033.
86. Gartenberg v. Merrill Lynch Asset Mgmt., Inc., 694 F.2d 923 (2d Cir. 1982).
87. Id. at 928 (citing Fogel v. Chestnutt, 668 F.2d 100, 112 (2d Cir. 1981)).
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behind section 36(b) explicitly wanted something more than a waste test.”88
Nevertheless, Gartenberg was recognized by most circuit courts of appeals
as the predominant standard for mutual fund fee cases,89 and its
“disproportionately large” language played a major role in blunting
challenges brought by fund shareholders.
In Jones v. Harris Associates L.P., the Seventh Circuit attacked the
Gartenberg standard,90 essentially holding that section 36(b) challenges
should be evaluated solely on procedural grounds. “A fiduciary must make
full disclosure and play no tricks but is not subject to a cap on
compensation.”91 The court also argued that the mutual fund market is
competitive and that investors can protect their interests simply by moving
their money from one fund to another.92 The Supreme Court, however,
upheld Gartenberg, specifically endorsing its “so disproportionately large”
formulation.93 Justice Alito’s opinion defines a breach of fiduciary duty as
a transaction that is “outside the range that arm’s-length bargaining would
produce,”94 encourages “a measure of deference” to the decisions of
disinterested directors on the fund’s board,95 and warns that “the standard
for fiduciary breach under § 36(b) does not call for judicial secondguessing of informed board decisions.”96
Because it affirms the
Gartenberg standard and defers to mutual fund boards, the Supreme
Court’s opinion is unlikely to change actual industry behavior.97
For some commentators, that is just fine. As discussed above,

88. Langevoort, supra note 67, at 1024. On closer reading, Gartenberg muddies its
own waters, since it also states, “the test is essentially whether the fee schedule represents a
charge within the range of what would have been negotiated at arm’s length in light of all
the surrounding circumstances,” which is not quite the same thing. Gartenberg, 694 F.2d at
928.
89. Jones, 130 S. Ct. at 1425 (“[U]ntil the Seventh Circuit’s decision below, something
of a consensus had developed regarding the standard set forth over 25 years ago in
Gartenberg.”).
90. Jones v. Harris Assocs. L.P., 527 F.3d 627, 632 (7th Cir. 2008) (“[W]e are
skeptical about Gartenberg because it relies too little on markets.”).
91. Id. Although Judge Easterbrook recognized that “[i]t is possible to imagine
compensation so unusual that a court will infer that deceit must have occurred, or that the
persons responsible for decision have abdicated,” in that case, the disproportionately large
fee is not itself the problem; the problem is the procedural flaw it implies. Id.
92. Id. at 634.
93. Jones, 130 S. Ct. at 1426.
94. Id. at 1427.
95. Id. at 1428.
96. Id. at 1430.
97. The Court did say that it was appropriate to compare a mutual fund’s fees to the
fees charged by the same fund adviser to its institutional clients. Id. at 1428–29. This
comparison had been rejected by Gartenberg. Gartenberg v. Merrill Lynch Asset Mgmt.,
Inc., 694 F.2d 923, 930 n.3 (2nd Cir. 1982).
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Easterbrook argued that high mutual fund fees are simply not a problem: If
people are paying the fees in a competitive market, they must be getting
their money’s worth. “The trustees (and in the end investors, who vote
with their feet and dollars) . . . determine how much advisory services are
worth.”98 But the empirical evidence, as summarized above,99 does not
bear out this rosy view of the market: While a few fund managers may be
able to beat stock indexes, in general, fund expenses are strongly and
negatively correlated with gross returns, let alone net returns. Despite the
existence of competition, many investors are paying whole percentage
points or more in fees for services that provide them with negative value.100
Some analysts have proposed various ways to strengthen the existing
governance model for mutual funds, whether by requiring that seventy-five
percent of fund directors be disinterested,101 mandating comparative
disclosure of fund expenses to promote more effective board oversight,102
holding disinterested directors to the standards required of independent
directors in corporate law,103 or asking courts to show less deference to
disinterested directors.104 Langevoort cautions, however, that “[i]n the
absence of some means of forcing on the industry disinterested directors
whose ideology is fiduciary rather than consumerist . . . the more
reasonable legal reaction is to keep expectations in check.”105 Fund
directors are not likely to be active defenders of investor interests, and that
is unlikely to change, since investors can always sell their fund shares
instead of expending effort in monitoring directors.106 Given that a mutual
98. Jones v. Harris Assocs. L.P., 527 F.3d 627, 632 (7th Cir. 2008); see also
Henderson, supra note 63, at 1038–48 (arguing that the real problem is not mutual fund fees
but value-destroying strike suits over fund fees by plaintiffs and their attorneys).
99. See supra Part C.
100. There is also a curious conceptual tension in Easterbrook’s argument. If the prices
of mutual funds are efficient, it is hard to argue that the prices of stocks are inefficient. And
if stock prices are efficient, then trying to beat the market is a fool’s errand.
101. Investment Company Governance, Investment Company Act Release No. 26,520,
83 SEC Docket 1384 (July 27, 2004). The SEC rules were effectively vacated by Chamber
of Commerce of U.S. v. S.E.C., 443 F.3d 890 (D.C. Cir. 2006). There is some correlation
between independent directors and better governance, but the causality could run either way.
In Alan Palmiter’s words: “[I]t seems more likely that investor-friendly management
firms . . . are more likely to have truly independent directors . . . .” Palmiter, supra note 69,
at 200.
102. James D. Cox & John W. Payne, Mutual Fund Expense Disclosures: A Behavioral
Perspective, 83 WASH. U. L.Q. 907, 937 (2005).
103. Johnson, supra note 79, at 530–31.
104. Langevoort, supra note 67, at 1042.
105. Langevoort, supra note 67, at 1041.
106. Because investors can always sell their fund shares at net asset value, they are not
locked into their investments and can simply sell out rather than engage in attempts at
shareholder governance. Coates & Hubbard, supra note 64, at 162; see also Langevoort,
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fund is typically the creature of its fund adviser and effectively captive to it
since it has no independent operational existence, it is also debatable
whether a fund’s board has the negotiating power necessary to adequately
represent shareholder interests.107
For these reasons, other commentators have argued that the current
regulatory structure, based on the shareholder governance model, should be
replaced with straightforward product regulation since investing in a
mutual fund is more like buying an ordinary consumer product than it is
like becoming a beneficiary of a trust or a shareholder in a corporation.
“[M]utual fund investments are products,” writes Langevoort, “no
different, really, from health care, insurance, bank deposits, residential real
estate, and other important settings where consumers are often less than
diligent.”108 Jill Fisch proposes to replace the structure created by the 1940
Act with a new “conform or explain” model, in which a new federal agency
would define standardized investment products and fund companies would
have to explain how their products differed from those standards.109 John
Morley and Quinn Curtis propose ending shareholder voting and
eliminating the role of boards in setting fund strategy and negotiating fees.
If price regulation were necessary, they would prefer “an honest-togoodness price cap enforceable by the government.”110
Product-style regulation, however, would likely do little to protect
ordinary investors from expensive active funds. Typical regulatory
regimes (such as those imposed by the National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration or the Food and Drug Administration) include minimum
safety standards to protect the public from catastrophic harms and
disclosure rules to further informed choice.111 With mutual funds, however,

supra note 67 at 1031–32 (describing why corporate governance mechanisms do not work
for mutual funds); Morley & Curtis, supra note 67, at 89 (explaining why investors prefer to
simply sell their interests rather than invest effort in governance).
107. Palmiter, supra note 69, at 173 (“[The board] has no realistic option (or threat) to
hire a new investment adviser or management firm.”). In practice, funds virtually never fire
their fund advisers. See Henderson, supra note 63, at 1032 (examining board practices,
including an aversion to firing advisers); Morley & Curtis, supra note 67, at 95 (“As a
practical matter, boards never fire management companies . . . .”).
108. Langevoort, supra note 67, at 1037. Indeed, Langevoort argues that this mindset
has become prevalent in the industry, including among mutual fund directors, and is one
reason why directors do not play their appointed role effectively. Langevoort, supra note
67, at 1041; see also Johnson, supra note 79, at 504 (“This arrangement has led some,
including former SEC Chairman Harvey Pitt, to describe mutual funds as ‘products,’ not
companies.”).
109. Fisch, supra note 67, at 1961, 1966.
110. Morley & Curtis, supra note 67, at 133, 139.
111. FDA Food Safety Modernization Act, Pub. L. No. 111-353 (2011) (revising food
safety regulation); 49 C.F.R. §§ 571.100-500 (2011) (providing safety standards for
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neither high fund expenses nor the risks of active investing qualify as a
catastrophic outcome. This makes it difficult to envision a complete bar on
active funds on traditional consumer protection grounds.112 Mutual funds
are already required to disclose their expenses, but this has not deterred
many investors from investing in unnecessarily expensive funds.
Disclosures could certainly be improved,113 but even then they would be
unlikely to blunt widespread investor enthusiasm for expensive funds
because of the behavioral reasons described earlier.114 Only a small amount
of optimism bias or a small amount of successful marketing is required to
make an expensive fund seem like a smart investment decision.115 In
summary, general mutual fund regulation is unlikely to shift the industry
away from expensive, actively managed funds and toward low-cost index
funds.
B. Employer-Sponsored Pension Plan Regulation
Employer-sponsored pensions have never been an entirely private
affair. The system of employment-based pension plans that evolved in the
wake of World War II was a publicly subsidized complement to the stillcontroversial Social Security system created in the New Deal.116 Employer
pensions were the private sector’s preferred alternative to the prospect of
Social Security becoming the nation’s sole provider of retirement
insurance. Employers both feared Social Security as an example of big
government and wanted to use private pensions as a tool to attract workers,
keep them loyal for long periods of time, and motivate them to retire when
the time came. As a result, in the decades following World War II, many
large American companies created defined benefit pension plans that
promised fixed retirement benefits to employees based mainly on their
automobiles); Jones v. Harris Assocs. L.P., 527 F.3d 627, 634 (7th Cir. 2008) (mentioning
automobile regulation); Fisch, supra note 67, at 2029 (mentioning pharmaceutical
regulation); Morley & Curtis, supra note 67, at 131–32 (mentioning tire regulation).
112. An absolute ban would also constitute a severe incursion into the free market for
investment products and the freedom of the individual investor, which might be hard to
justify given the evidence that at least some fund managers can deliver superior expected
returns.
113. For example, fund expenses could be presented along with information about the
expenses charged by other similar funds. Cox & Payne, supra note 102, at 936.
114. See supra Part C.
115. See Omri Ben-Shahar & Carl E. Schneider, The Failure of Mandated Disclosure,
159 U. PA. L. REV. 647 (2011) (arguing that mandated disclosure is ineffective and
counterproductive).
116. See JACOB S. HACKER, THE DIVIDED WELFARE STATE: THE BATTLE OVER PUBLIC
AND PRIVATE SOCIAL BENEFITS IN THE UNITED STATES 85–173 (2002) (discussing the history
of private pensions in the U.S.).
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salaries and years of service.
Beginning in the 1960s, concerns about these plans created increasing
pressure for greater federal regulation, culminating in the passage of
ERISA in 1974. ERISA was largely concerned with problems specific to
defined benefit plans, including underfunding of pensions, onerous vesting
requirements that left many employees without benefits, and even outright
theft.117 These problems were due in part to conflicts between the shortterm interests of employers and employees: Most crudely, every dollar not
paid in benefits was a dollar the company could keep for its shareholders.
The solution devised by ERISA was to apply the principles of trust law,
both by requiring all employer plans to constitute themselves as trusts,118
and by imposing specific fiduciary duties, derived from trust law, on
various people involved in managing a plan.119
Retirement plan fiduciaries are defined to include anyone who
“exercises any discretionary authority or discretionary control respecting
management of such plan or exercises any authority or control respecting
management or disposition of its assets.”120 In a defined benefit plan, those
fiduciaries are responsible for investing the assets of the plan to ensure that
there will be enough money to meet future obligations to plan
participants—a role similar to that of a trustee managing the assets of a
trust for its beneficiaries. Like trustees, plan fiduciaries owe to plan
participants and beneficiaries a duty of exclusive loyalty and a duty of care
modeled on the “prudent man” standard,121 a staple of trust investment law
in the United States since the early nineteenth century.122 In addition,
ERISA imposes a duty of “diversifying the investments of the plan so as to
minimize the risk of large losses,”123 a duty recognized by trust law since
the late nineteenth century, though not codified in the Restatement of

117. Stabile, supra note 60, at 366–67.
118. 29 U.S.C. § 1103(a) (2006); see, e.g., Harris Trust & Sav. Bank v. Salomon Smith
Barney Inc., 530 U.S. 238, 250 (2000) (“The common law of trusts . . . offers a ‘starting
point for analysis [of ERISA]’ . . . .”) (alteration in original) (quoting Hughes Aircraft Co. v.
Jacobson, 525 U.S. 432, 447 (1999)).
119. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a) (2006).
120. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A)(i) (2006).
121. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1) (2006) (“[A] fiduciary shall discharge his duties with
respect to a plan solely in the interest of the participants and beneficiaries and (A) for the
exclusive purpose of (i) providing benefits to participants and their beneficiaries; and (ii)
defraying reasonable expenses of administering the plan . . . . [A] fiduciary shall discharge
his duties . . . with the care, skill, prudence, and diligence under the circumstances then
prevailing that a prudent man acting in a like capacity and familiar with such matters would
use in the conduct of an enterprise of a like character and with like aims . . . .”).
122. John H. Langbein, The Uniform Prudent Investor Act and the Future of Trust
Investing, 81 IOWA L. REV. 641, 644-46 (1996).
123. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(C) (2006).
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Trusts until the early 1990s.124 These core fiduciary duties were intended to
ensure that plan participants received the benefit of prudent, skilled
investment management.
Again, as with mutual fund regulation, this sounds good in principle.
Yet, as mentioned above, participants in employer-sponsored defined
contribution plans are just as likely as anyone else to invest in expensive
active funds. One underlying reason is that ERISA was written in a world
of defined benefit plans, and many of its provisions only make sense in that
context. Since 1974, however, the pension landscape has shifted towards
defined contribution plans, particularly after the Internal Revenue Code
was amended in 1978 to allow what are now known as 401(k) plans. The
result is that employer-sponsored pensions are governed by a statute that
was largely written for another age and another set of economic and legal
challenges. Several of the protections that ERISA purports to provide to
plan participants, such as its funding requirements,125 are no longer relevant
for defined contribution plans, while the protections that are necessary in a
defined contribution world are absent.
In particular, ERISA partially weakens the fiduciary duties that apply
in the context of defined contribution plans that allow participants to make
their own investment decisions. ERISA section 404(c) relieves plan
fiduciaries from liability for any losses resulting from the participant’s
“exercise of control” over her account.126 This seems to imply that they can
escape the duty of investing plan assets prudently simply by shifting that
responsibility onto individual participants. Combined with section 401(k)
of the Internal Revenue Code, section 404(c) is a major reason why
employers today favor participant-directed defined contribution plans.127
Section 404(c) seems to make sense: It says that if a plan participant
makes a bad investment decision, her employer should not be liable for her
124. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS: PRUDENT INVESTOR RULE § 227(b) (2007);
Langbein, supra note 122, at 646.
125. 29 U.S.C. §§1081–86 (2006).
126. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(c)(1)(A) (2006). On 29 U.S.C. § 1104(c)(1)(A) (2006) generally,
see Colleen E. Medill, The Individual Responsibility Model of Retirement Plans Today:
Conforming ERISA Policy to Reality, 49 EMORY L.J. 1, 33–38 (2000) (detailing section
404(c)’s implications for employers); C. Frederick Reish & Bruce L. Ashton, ERISA Section
404(c): Shifting Fiduciary Liability in Participant-Directed Retirement Plans, 5 J. TAX’N
EMP. BENEFITS 175 (1997) (describing the requirements for transferring certain investment
responsibilities to employees); Stabile, supra note 60, at 365–78 (describing the historical
underpinnings of section 404(c) and its practical consequences for employers and
employees).
127. See Stabile, supra note 60, at 366 (noting that “large numbers of employers have
restructured their 401(k) plans” in order to reduce their liability for participants’ losses);
Zelinsky, supra note 27, at 478–79 (discussing section 404(c) as lessening employers’
fiduciary burden).
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losses. But in practice, it has often been interpreted to mean that an
employer can include just about any investment options in its defined
contribution plan, including expensive active funds, without worrying
about ERISA’s fiduciary duties. Section 404(c) requires the Department of
Labor to define when a participant has exercised control over her account.
Under the current regulations, to qualify for the safe harbor, a plan must
give the participant the ability to “exercise control over assets in his
individual account” and must provide “a broad range of investment
alternatives.”128 To meet the latter criterion, the plan must allow the
participant to (a) “materially affect the potential return . . . and the degree
of risk” of her investments; (b) choose from at least three diversified,
dissimilar investment alternatives that together allow her to increase
diversification, reduce risk, and reach any point on the appropriate range of
the risk-return spectrum; and (c) diversify her holdings to “minimize the
risk of large losses.”129 These regulations can be met by offering at least
three different, diversified mutual funds. In terms of relevant costs, the
definition of a “broad range of investment alternatives” does not mention
investment expenses, while the definition of “control” allows a plan to
“impose[] charges for reasonable expenses.”130 A set of expensive, actively
managed mutual funds would seem to comply with the regulations.
The courts have generally held that expensive mutual funds are
compatible with the regulations and do not constitute a breach of fiduciary
duty.131 In Hecker v. Deere & Co., the Seventh Circuit rejected an
excessive fee claim because the plan in question offered more than twenty
mutual funds, including some with low fees, and also allowed participants
to select from over two thousand other funds through Fidelity’s
BrokerageLink service.132 The court justified the funds’ fees by appealing
to the market,133 a justification that applies to all fees charged by all funds
open to retail investors. In other cases, district courts have endorsed plans
because they included a few low-cost funds along with the allegedly

128. 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404c-1(b)(1).
129. Id. § 2550.404c-1(b)(3)(i).
130. Id. § 2550.404c-1(b)(2)(ii)(A). Given its context, however, this language should
only apply to reasonable expenses for executing transactions. That would still leave the
regulation silent on the topic of investment management expenses.
131. See Ellen M. Doyle & Stephen M. Pincus, Restoring Retirement Nest Eggs, TRIAL
Apr. 2009, at 46, 46–47 (citing claims that made allegations of excessive fund fees).
132. Hecker v. Deere & Co., 556 F.3d 575, 586 (7th Cir. 2009) (“The fact that it is
possible that some other funds might have had even lower ratios is beside the point . . . .”).
133. Id. (noting that “all of these funds were also offered to investors in the general
public, and so the expense ratios necessarily were set against the backdrop of market
competition”).
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expensive ones,134 because the funds in question were typical of those
included in similar plans,135 or, because the funds were selected through an
adequately thorough process.136
Plaintiffs have had slightly more success when linking high fund
expenses to failures of disclosure, arguing that a participant cannot exercise
meaningful control over her account if she does not have adequate
information. The regulations require that the participant receive “sufficient
information to make informed investment decisions with regard to
investment alternatives available under the plan.”137 Some courts have held
that simply disclosing all applicable expenses138 is sufficient to insulate a
plan against challenge. In Hecker, for example, the complaint alleged that
one Fidelity subsidiary, the trustee of the retirement plans, received
payments from another Fidelity subsidiary that managed money for funds
included in those plans; according to the allegation, the trustee used those
payments to discount the administrative fee that it charged to the employer.
In other words, the employer saved money by allowing the trustee to make
money off of plan participants via the revenue-sharing arrangement.139 The
Seventh Circuit, however, held that there was no duty to disclose the
revenue-sharing arrangement because it was not material.140 In Braden v.
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., by contrast, the plaintiffs alleged that mutual funds
were included in their plans because the funds made payments to Merrill
Lynch, the plan trustee and administrator.141 The Eighth Circuit agreed that
information about revenue sharing could be material because it “could
influence a reasonable participant in evaluating his or her options under the

134. Renfro v. Unisys Corp., No. 07-2098, 2010 WL 1688540, at *6 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 26,
2010).
135. Kanawi v. Bechtel Corp., 590 F. Supp. 2d 1213, 1230 (N.D. Cal. 2008).
136. Taylor v. United Techs. Corp., No. 3:06cv1494 (WWE), 2009 WL 535779, at *10
(D. Conn. Mar. 3, 2009); Kanawi, 590 F. Supp. 2d at 1230.
137. 29 C.F.R. § 2550-404c-1(b)(2)(i)(B).
138. The regulations specifically require detailed disclosure of administrative expenses
(charged at the plan level), individual expenses (charged at the individual account level),
and fees and expenses associated with each investment alternative. 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404a5(c)(2), (c)(3), and (d)(1).
139. Hecker, 556 F.3d at 578.
140. Id. at 585–86. Other courts have similarly ruled that revenue sharing agreements
do not need to be disclosed to plan participants. See Renfro v. Unisys Corp., No. 07-2098,
2010 WL 1688540, at *7 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 26, 2010) (holding revenue sharing arrangement
details to be irrelevant to proper execution of fiduciary duties); Taylor, 2009 WL at *12–13
(ruling that revenue sharing fees paid by participants through administrative fees, rather than
by the employer, need not be disclosed); Tussey v. ABB, Inc., No. 06-04305-CV-NKL,
2008 WL 379666, at *2 (W.D. Mo. Feb. 11, 2008) (agreeing with Eighth Circuit precedent
in holding that employers have no duty to disclose trustees’ revenue sharing arrangements).
141. Braden v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 588 F.3d 585, 589–90 (8th Cir. 2009).
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Plan.”142
Even in Braden, however, where the complaint attacked the plan’s
mutual funds on multiple substantive grounds (alleging that they charged
unnecessarily high fees, underperformed available alternatives, offered
expensive retail shares instead of cheaper institutional shares, and charged
marketing fees that did not benefit participants),143 the Eighth Circuit’s
reversal of the district court’s motion to dismiss was based on the
disclosure issue.144 More generally, the court seemed to maintain that a
fiduciary breach must be procedural in nature.145 At best, it seems, the
courts will require plan sponsors to avoid conflicts of interest (or at least
disclose them) and do a thorough job of documenting their fund selection
processes. This may eliminate one motivation for plan fiduciaries to offer
high-fee funds in participant-directed plans, but it is unlikely to motivate
those fiduciaries to seek out lower-cost mutual funds instead.
In summary, as currently interpreted by the courts, the law at most
demands that plan fiduciaries select a menu of mutual funds that are not
uniformly more expensive than industry norms. ERISA’s explicit
endorsement of participant-directed accounts seemingly makes it
impossible to require employers to take more of an interest in their
employees’ retirement savings options. Given this situation, one logical
proposal has been to amend ERISA to eliminate participant direction
altogether,146 or repeal section 404(c),147 but this is, for political reasons,
highly unlikely. Furthermore, this proposal would leave employees reliant
on the managers of their pension funds, and there is little reason to believe
that these managers are any more likely to beat the market than active
mutual funds. Other proposals have included improved disclosures, better
default options, and more and better financial education and advice for plan
participants.148 But while information, education, and advice might help
142. Id. at 600.
143. Id. at 599. The marketing (12b-1) fees are used to compensate brokers and other
intermediaries who sell a mutual fund.
144. Id. (“A reasonable trier of fact could find that failure to disclose this information
would mislead a reasonable participant in the process of making investment decisions under
the Plan.”).
145. Id. at 596 (“If these allegations are substantiated, the process by which appellees
selected and managed the funds in the Plan would have been tainted by failure of effort,
competence, or loyalty.”).
146. Susan J. Stabile, Paternalism Isn’t Always a Dirty Word: Can the Law Better
Protect Defined Contribution Plan Participants?, 5 EMP. RTS. & EMP’T POL’Y J. 491, 513–
14 (2001).
147. Stabile, supra note 60, at 397.
148. E.g., Befort, supra note 15 at 976–78; Medill, supra note 126, at 75–77 (offering
proposals to increase the education and advice offered to plan participants); James J. Choi et
al., Are Empowerment and Education Enough? Underdiversification in 401(k) Plans, 36
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solve some of the other problems with 401(k) and similar plans not
addressed in this Article, these changes would do little on their own to
improve the set of investment alternatives available to participants.
III. MAKING ERISA WORK
This Part argues for a different solution. Read in light of trust
investment law and the context of ERISA, section 404(c) should not excuse
plan sponsors and administrators from the duty to look out for participant
interests when selecting investment options. Properly interpreted, that duty
should imply a presumption against active managed mutual funds and in
favor of low-cost index funds. The current Department of Labor
regulations implementing section 404(c) are misleadingly broad, and the
safe harbor they define should be restricted to plans that only offer low-cost
index funds, at least for the segments of the market where indexing is
available and inexpensive.
Before getting to the 404(c) safe harbor, it is first necessary to discuss
modern trust investment law and how, through ERISA, it applies to pension
plans.
A. Trust Investment Law in a Nutshell
In 1976, John Langbein and Richard Posner helped introduce index
investing to the legal community in an article arguing that trustees could
invest in index funds without violating the trust investment law of the
time.149 More importantly, they also argued that trustees should invest in
index funds. After summarizing modern portfolio theory, they stated,
“[t]he next question is how much picking and choosing the trustee should
do within the class of publicly traded securities. . . . [O]ur real answer is
‘none.’”150 They then summarized the empirical evidence against active
fund management before concluding:
[T]he trustee’s rational strategy . . . is to buy shares in a mutual
fund or other investment vehicle that holds the market
portfolio—a market fund—and then combine those shares either
with borrowing, if he wants more “play” than the market
portfolio, or with some relatively riskless asset such as Treasury

BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY 151, 193 (2005) (recommending that default options
be changed to reduce participants’ holdings of employer stock).
149. John H. Langbein & Richard A. Posner, Market Funds and Trust-Investment Law,
1976 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 1 (1976).
150. Id. at 14.
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notes if he wants less.151
Investing in index funds, they continued, was not just the
economically rational thing to do; it was also consistent with the various
precepts of trust investment law.152 While they did not say that trustees had
a duty to invest solely in index funds, they saw that possibility in the future:
When market funds have become available in sufficient variety
and their experience bears out their prospects, courts may one
day conclude that it is imprudent for trustees to fail to use such
vehicles. Their advantages seem decisive: at any given
risk/return level, diversification is maximized and investment
costs minimized. A trustee who declines to procure such
advantages for the beneficiaries of his trust may in the future find
his conduct difficult to justify.153
In the past thirty-five years, the empirical evidence has largely borne
out the advantages of index funds, yet the courts have not recognized the
duty to invest in them that Langbein and Posner foresaw. One contributing
factor is perhaps that even the U.S. stock markets have turned out to be not
quite as efficient as the proponents of the efficient markets hypothesis
believed in the 1970s. But the studies reviewed above indicate that they
are certainly efficient enough to make choosing among actively managed
stock funds a losing proposition for most people.
Even though the courts have not adopted a duty to invest in index
funds, the basic principles of modern trust investment law do dictate a
strong presumption in their favor. This is apparent on a close reading of
the Restatement (Third) of Trusts. The full Restatement (Third) was
published in 2003, but sections 227 through 229, governing trust
investment, were released in 1992 as sections 90 through 92 of the
Restatement, Trusts (Prudent Investor Rule).
The “prudent investor” standard, as defined by the Restatement,
“requires the exercise of reasonable care, skill, and caution,”154 which
implies that “[t]he trustee must give reasonably careful consideration to
both the formulation and the implementation of an appropriate investment
strategy . . . .”155 Since many generally reasonable people invest in active
funds, such investments might seem presumptively reasonable under the
151. Id. at 18. In practice, this means that the only risky investment an investor should
hold is an index fund tracking the market as a whole; she can obtain more risk and return by
leveraging this investment with borrowing or less risk and return by putting some of her
money in Treasury bills.
152. Id. at 18–30.
153. Id. at 30.
154. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 90(a) (2007).
155. Id. § 90 cmt. d.
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prudent investor standard. The Restatement does not necessarily authorize
any investment behavior simply because many other people do it; instead,
it recognizes that expert knowledge and skill may be required to meet the
prudent investment standard.156 But this is still not enough to derive a duty
to avoid actively managed funds, since many people who might qualify as
experts—including the managers of most mutual funds—engage in active
management.157
In addition to the general requirement of care and skill, the prudent
investor rule imposes several additional duties on trustees, including the
duties to avoid unreasonable costs, to diversify the investments of the trust,
and to avoid imprudent delegation of investment responsibilities.158 While
trust law had always required trustees to minimize costs,159 the Restatement
(Third) situates this duty in the context of modern finance. Section
90(c)(3) requires trustees to “incur only costs that are reasonable in amount
and appropriate to the investment responsibilities of the trusteeship.”160
The Introductory Note to the chapter on trust investment gives additional
meaning to this requirement:
[T]he duty to avoid unwarranted costs is given increased
emphasis in the prudent investor rule. This is done to reflect the
importance of market-efficiency concepts and differences in the
degrees of efficiency and inefficiency in various markets. . . .
The duty to be cost conscious requires attention to such matters
as the cumulation of fiduciary commissions with agent fees or the
purchase and management charges associated with mutual funds
and other pooled-investment vehicles. In addition, active
management strategies involve investigation expenses and other
transaction costs (including capital-gains taxation) that must be
considered, realistically, in relation to the likelihood of increased
return from such strategies.161
The more efficient a market is, the less reason to expend effort (and

156. Id. (“The duty to exercise both care and skill in investment management may
require knowledge and experience greater than that of an individual of ordinary intelligence,
depending on the investment strategy to be employed.”).
157. Note that not all active asset management is created equal. In illiquid asset classes
without widely available information, active management makes more sense. Having very
large amounts of money can also make active management more attractive, as for Warren
Buffett. However, the fact that some very smart and very successful investors invest
actively in some asset classes does not imply that active management is a viable strategy for
other investors in highly liquid asset classes such as U.S. stocks.
158. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 90 (2007).
159. Langbein, supra note 122, at 653.
160. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 90 (2007).
161. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS ch. 17, intro. note (2007).
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costs) in making active investment decisions. Trustees are counseled
specifically to consider the expenses deducted by mutual funds and are
warned away from engaging in active management strategies unless those
strategies can be justified by increased expected returns. The last point
applies equally well to stock picking by trustees and to investing in actively
managed funds, which pass their “investigation expenses and other
transaction costs” through to fund investors.162 On its own, this discussion
of reasonable costs in the context of active investment strategies might
create something of a presumption against actively managed mutual funds
for market segments where cheaper index funds are available.
But there is more. The explicit duty of diversification, which the
Restatement made part of the definition of prudent investing, is not simply
based on the desire to avoid large losses, but derived from modern portfolio
theory.163 Investment risk can be separated into two categories: market
risk (the variance of the returns of the market as a whole) and specific risk
(the variance of the returns of an individual security that is not due to
market risk). Investors can gain higher expected returns by taking on more
market risk; specific risk, however, can be diversified away, and therefore
does not provide higher returns.164 This means that investors should only
take on market risk.165 The Restatement advised trustees to seek “the
lowest level of risk and cost for a particular level of expected return,”166
which implies eliminating specific risk through diversification.167 The
Restatement further states that “[t]he ultimate goal of diversification would
be to achieve a portfolio with only the rewarded or ‘market’ element of
162. Id.
163. Id. § 90, reporter’s general note on comments e–h; Langbein, supra note 122, at
647–49.
164. To illustrate this, assume that the market is composed of only two companies that
are identical in all respects and have the same stock price today but whose stock prices are
completely uncorrelated. Investing in only one of those companies is more risky than
investing in both of them, but does not provide higher expected returns, since the expected
returns of the two stocks are identical. This shows that taking on more specific risk is not
compensated for by higher expected returns.
165. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 90 cmt. g (2007) (“[T]he expected return is not
affected by the portfolio’s reduced level of what is often called ‘specific’ or ‘unique’ risk—
insofar as those terms are used to refer to risks that can be reduced by diversification. Other
types of risk, however, are generally compensated through market pricing, so that the
expected return from an investment or portfolio is directly affected by the level of these
risks that cannot be diversified away—the so-called ‘market’ or ‘systematic’ risks.”); see
also id. § 90 cmt. e(1) (“[T]he requirement of caution ordinarily imposes a duty to use
reasonable care and skill in an effort to minimize or at least reduce diversifiable risks.”).
166. Id. § 90 cmt. f.
167. Id. § 90 cmt. g (“[A] trustee’s duty of prudent investing normally calls for
reasonable efforts to reduce diversifiable risks, while no such generalization can be made
with respect to market risk.”).
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risk.”168 This degree of diversification can most easily by achieved by
investing in index funds. It is possible to obtain virtually all of the benefits
of diversification by buying about thirty stocks, but this depends on the
degree of correlation between the returns of those stocks169
The discussions of passive and active investing in the comments to
section 90 make a stronger case for index funds. The comments
recommend index funds as a vehicle for investing in stocks.170 More
revealing, however, is the discussion of active strategies. While the
relevant comment begins, “[p]rudent investment principles also allow the
use of more active management strategies by trustees,”171 the examples it
provides are real estate and venture capital—relatively illiquid, inefficient
markets where indexing is not available.172 In general, the comment warns,
“[i]f the extra costs and risks of an investment program are substantial,
these added costs and risks must be justified by realistically evaluated
return expectations.”173 In particular, it must be true that the “gains from
the course of action in question can reasonably be expected to compensate
for its additional costs and risks” and that “there is a credible basis for
concluding that the trustee—or the manager of a particular activity—
possesses or has access to the competence necessary to carry out the
program.”174 Furthermore, although the Restatement recognized that
trustees could sometimes delegate their investment responsibilities, the
duty to avoid imprudent delegation—to “act with prudence in deciding
whether and how to delegate authority”—means that a trustee must
168. Id.
169. According to the mutual fund separation theorem, under certain assumptions, all
investors should hold risky assets in the same proportions; investors who want more risk and
higher returns should hold less of the risk-free asset, while those who want less risk and
lower returns should hold more of the risk-free asset. In other words, investors should all
buy differing amounts of only two assets: (a) an index fund reflecting the entire market and
(b) cash or Treasury bills. See generally Niko Canner et al., An Asset Allocation Puzzle, 87
AM. ECON. REV. 181, 182 (1997). The assumptions behind the theorem are not fully
satisfied in practice, but the basic principle that there is no reason to take on specific risk
holds in most circumstances.
170. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 90 cmt. h(1) (2007) (“Investing in index funds
that track major stock exchanges or widely published listings of publicly traded stocks is
illustrative of an essentially passive but practical investment alternative to be considered by
trustees seeking to include corporate equity in their portfolios. It is one that offers the
pricing security and economies of buying in essentially efficient markets.”). The comment
later allows for the “direct purchase of appropriate stocks,” but only for purposes of
“broadening . . . the portfolio’s diversification.” Now that index funds are available for the
entire U.S. stock market, this rationale no longer applies.
171. Id. § 90 cmt. h(2).
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id.
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seriously consider whether a fund manager has the ability to deliver
superior returns before investing the trust’s money in her mutual fund,
which poses another barrier to investing in active funds.175
These hurdles are difficult to clear for a trustee who chooses to invest
in domestic stocks through actively managed mutual funds rather than lowcost index funds. Both theory and empirical evidence argue strongly that
there are no “gains from the course of action in question,” let alone gains
sufficient to compensate for the higher costs of active funds.176 Nor is it
likely that there could be a “credible basis” for concluding that a given fund
manager has the ability to beat the market on a risk-adjusted basis.177
These facts are acknowledged in the Reporter’s comments, noting that
“fiduciaries and other investors are confronted with potent evidence that
the application of expertise, investigation, and diligence in efforts to ‘beat
the market’ in these publicly traded securities ordinarily promises little or
no payoff, in fact, often a negative payoff after taking account of research
and transaction costs.”178
The Restatement, then, argues strongly against incurring the additional
costs of active management, at least in liquid markets such as U.S. stocks.
Unlike Gartenberg, which presumptively allows mutual fund fees that are
relatively close to those elsewhere in the industry, the Restatement does not
license any investment strategy simply because other reasonable people are
using it. Instead, both the duty to avoid unreasonable costs and the duty to
diversify require trustees to specifically consider whether the additional
costs and reduced diversification of active management are justified. And,
in the abstract, the comments to the Restatement argue that they are not.
This is almost as strong a position against actively managed stock funds as
the Restatement could have taken, given its attempt to be flexible to the
different circumstances of different trusts.179 It is certainly possible to
conceive of situations where a trustee might reasonably want to make
active investments in domestic equities; for example, a trust with a
significant, illiquid position in a private energy business might want to take
a short position in public energy companies and a long position in the rest
of the stock market. But the Restatement does imply that a trustee

175. Id. § 90(c)(2).
176. Id. § 90 cmt. (h)(2).
177. Id.
178. Id. § 90, reporter’s general note on comments e–h.
179. See, e.g., id. ch. 17, intro. note (“[T]he objectives of the ‘prudent investor rule’ of
this Restatement Third range from that of liberating expert trustees to pursue challenging,
rewarding, nontraditional strategies when appropriate to the particular trust, to that of
providing other trustees with reasonably clear guidance to safe harbors that are practical,
adaptable, readily identifiable, and expectedly rewarding.”).
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investing a liquid portfolio for a beneficiary with no particular special
circumstances might face the burden of explaining to a court why she
invested the trust’s assets in actively managed domestic stock funds rather
than index funds.
B. Trust Investment Law and ERISA
Trust law is relevant to ERISA because that statute expressly
incorporated the law of trusts.180 By requiring that the assets of any
pension plan be held in trust—a requirement that has been imposed by the
Internal Revenue Code since 1921181—the statute automatically invoked
trust law.182 ERISA’s sections dealing with fiduciary duties were intended
to “make[] applicable . . . the law of trusts,”183 and the duties imposed by
section 404(a) are also closely modeled on the common law of trusts.184 In
Langbein’s words, “ERISA codifies the central principles of trust fiduciary
law, and ERISA’s legislative history makes clear that Congress meant to
track the common law of trusts. Thus, agencies and courts interpreting and
applying ERISA have inclined to rely upon the Restatement of Trusts and
upon the major trust-law treatises.”185 Important Supreme Court opinions
interpreting ERISA have recognized the central importance of trust law in
understanding the statute.186
However, “trust law does not tell the entire story,” as the Supreme
Court has held:
ERISA’s standards and procedural protections partly reflect a
congressional determination that the common law of trusts did
not offer completely satisfactory protection. And, even with
respect to the trust-like fiduciary standards ERISA imposes,

180. See Michael J. Collins, It’s Common, But Is It Right? The Common Law of Trusts
in ERISA Fiduciary Litigation, 16 LAB. LAW. 391, 395–97 (2001) (citing legislative intent to
have ERISA track traditional trust law’s fiduciary conduct rules); John H. Langbein, The
Secret Life of the Trust: The Trust as an Instrument of Commerce, 107 YALE L.J. 165, 168–
70 (1997) (describing the conscious parallel between ERISA and conventional trust law).
181. 29 U.S.C. § 1103(a) (2006).
182. Langbein, supra note 180, at 169.
183. H.R. REP. NO. 93-533, at 11 (1973) (Conf. Rep.).
184. Daniel Fischel & John H. Langbein, ERISA’s Fundamental Contradiction: The
Exclusive Benefit Rule, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1105, 1108 (1988).
185. Langbein, supra note 180, at 169.
186. See, e.g., Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 110 (1989)
(“ERISA abounds with the language and terminology of trust law. ERISA’s legislative
history confirms that the Act’s fiduciary responsibility provisions ‘codif[y] and mak[e]
applicable to [ERISA] fiduciaries certain principles developed in the evolution of the law of
trusts.’” (alteration in original) (citations omitted) (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 93-533, pt. 11
(1973))).
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Congress “expect[ed] that the courts will interpret this prudent
man rule (and the other fiduciary standards) bearing in mind the
special nature and purpose of employee benefit plans,” as they
“develop a federal common law of rights and obligations under
ERISA-regulated plans.187
In addition to trust law, courts must also consider the purposes of the
statute, in particular, “Congress’ desire to offer employees enhanced
protection for their benefits, on the one hand, and, on the other, its desire
not to create a system that is so complex that administrative costs, or
litigation expenses, unduly discourage employers from offering welfare
benefit plans in the first place.”188 The “federal common law” referred to
by the Supreme Court should build on the traditional common law but take
into consideration the particular characteristics of employer-sponsored
plans and the specific objectives of ERISA.
In fact, Congress in 1974 expanded upon existing trust investment law
in order to keep abreast of contemporary investing theory and practice. In
making the duty of diversification part of the prudent man standard, ERISA
anticipated the treatment of diversification in the Restatement (Third) of
Trusts.189 ERISA also explicitly abrogated the traditional non-delegation
rule of trust investing, which had limited the ability of trustees to hire
external asset managers (such as mutual fund managers).190 In expressly
authorizing pension plans to use external management, ERISA again
anticipated the Restatement, which allows trustees to delegate
responsibilities where it is prudent to do so.191
The principles of trust investment law expressed in the Restatement,
then, are relevant to the interpretation of ERISA for at least three reasons.
First, since ERISA expressly incorporates key concepts of the common law
of trusts, the meaning of those concepts continues to be governed, at least
as a starting point, by the common law of trusts. This is the position of the
Restatement itself: “The principles of this Restatement are generally

187. Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 497 (1996) (alteration in original) (citations
omitted) (quoting Firestone, 499 U.S. at 110).
188. Id.
189. See Langbein, supra note 122, at 646 (noting that “the trustee’s duty to diversify
has become more acute—for example, in ERISA, the 1974 federal pension legislation, a
fiduciary must diversify the investments of participants and beneficiaries to minimize risk of
loss unless doing so is clearly imprudent.”).
190. 29 U.S.C. § 1102(c)(3) (2006); see Langbein, supra note 122, at 652 (noting a
similar abrogation in the 1992 Restatement).
191. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 80(1) (2007); see also id. § 90 cmt. j (“In
administering the trust’s investment activities, the trustee has power, and may sometimes
have a duty, to delegate such functions and in such manner as a prudent investor would
delegate under the circumstances.”).
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appropriate to those statutory bodies of rules, both by analogy and insofar
as those rules expressly or impliedly incorporate general principles of trust
law.”192
Second, insofar as trust investment law has changed since 1974,
ERISA actually anticipated its future direction. Both ERISA’s emphasis on
diversification and its greater tolerance for delegation are consistent with
the subsequent reformulation of trust investment law in keeping with
modern financial theory and with the increasing specialization of the asset
management industry.193 By 1976, only two years after ERISA’s passage,
Langbein and Posner were able to argue that trustees should invest in index
funds and might one day have a duty to do so. This indicates that applying
the core principles of the Restatement to ERISA is not an anachronism that
does violence to contemporary legislative intent.
Third, the implications of contemporary trust investment law promote
one of the central purposes of ERISA, “offer[ing] employees enhanced
protection for their benefits,” while not affecting the other—encouraging
employers to offer employee benefits plans in the first place.194 The
Restatement encourages trustees to identify the risk-return combination
appropriate for a given trust and then to achieve that combination by
investing in index funds, at least for asset classes where that is practical.
The emphasis on minimizing risk and cost for a given level of expected
returns is particularly suited for pension plans, which are intended to
provide income security for employees after they retire. While an
individual trust might have a valid reason to undertake an unorthodox
investment strategy, this is unlikely to be true for an employer-sponsored
pension plan. In addition, from a public policy standpoint, nothing is
gained if some company pension plans beat the market spectacularly and
others trail the market dismally. The former companies (or their
employees) will enjoy a windfall while the latter will suffer losses or,
worse, go bankrupt and shift their pension obligations to taxpayers (via the
Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation, the federal insurer of private
pensions). Even if the gross gains of the one balance the gross losses of the
other, the additional costs of their active investment strategies will be a net
drain on the economy as a whole.
At the same time, there is no reason why holding employer-sponsored

192. Id. § 1 cmt. a(1).
193. See id. § 90, reporter’s general note (“[ERISA] and its 1979 regulations also reveal,
in still another context, a felt need for departures from traditional applications of the
prudent-man rule of trust law. This is indicated in part through the U.S. Department of
Labor regulations’ recognition of modern portfolio theory and of more flexible concepts (for
example, in delegation and in risk-return relationships).”).
194. Variety Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 497 (1996).

KWAK - FINALIZED (DO NOT DELETE)

2013]

IMPROVING RETIREMENT SAVINGS

3/3/2013 1:09 PM

521

pension plans to the requirements of current trust investment law would
make employers less likely to offer such plans, so long as those
requirements are clearly spelled out. From an administrative standpoint, it
is no more difficult or expensive to invest plan assets in index funds than to
invest them in actively managed funds. The important thing from the
employer’s standpoint is to avoid unnecessary litigation risk—the risk that
a court will find that its investment strategy constitutes a breach of
fiduciary duty. And litigation risk in this case depends less on the
substance of the law than on how clear that law is and whether or not
clearly defined safe harbors are available.
For these reasons, ERISA’s requirements for the investment of plan
assets should be informed by current trust investment law as expressed in
the Restatement (Third). Trust law, in turn, strongly counsels ERISA plan
fiduciaries to avoid active investing in liquid, efficient market segments
where low-cost indexing is available. They can adopt active investing
strategies in inefficient markets such as real estate or venture capital. They
can also invest actively in liquid markets such as domestic stocks, but only
if they can demonstrate that doing so complies with the standards of
prudent investing.
C. ERISA and Participant-Directed Accounts
ERISA, however, allows for participant-directed accounts. The
question, then, is what implications participant direction has for the duty of
plan fiduciaries to invest plan assets prudently. To answer that question,
we must first figure out the role of participant direction in a statute
dedicated to protecting employee benefits under employer pension plans.
ERISA predated the 401(k) revolution, and its drafters most likely did
not envision a world where people would be individually responsible for
both funding and investing their retirement accounts. Individual accounts
are a characteristic of defined contribution plans, not the defined benefit
plans that were common in the 1960s and early 1970s. The defined
contribution plans that existed at the time were mainly employee stock
ownership plans and profit-sharing plans.195 Since these were never
intended to be the main source of an employee’s retirement income, they
presumably did not require as much protection as traditional pension plans.
More generally, however, participant direction has an important and
positive role to play in a pension plan governed by trust investment law. A
pension plan may be responsible for providing retirement income to
thousands of participants of different ages, incomes, wealth categories,
195. Befort, supra note 15, at 959 n.131.
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family situations, health statuses, and so on. Trust law requires trustees to
avoid specific (uncompensated) risk, but it also recognizes that the
appropriate degree of market (compensated) risk depends on the particular
circumstances of the trust.196 In other words, there is a spectrum of
appropriate portfolios, each of which is fully diversified, differing only in
their degree of market risk.197 In a defined contribution plan, centralized
management of all plan assets would place every participant at the same
point on this risk-return spectrum, regardless of her individual situation.
Participant direction solves this problem by allowing each individual to
select the risk-return profile that best suits her individual situation, in effect
tailoring the trust’s investment strategy to the needs of each beneficiary.
Allowing each participant to select her preferred location on the
spectrum of appropriate portfolios is an improvement over centralized asset
management and is consistent with the principles of prudent investing
contained in trust law. Allowing each participant to construct an
inappropriate portfolio by selecting from investment options that violate
those principles, however, cannot possibly be prudent. When a participant
can choose from a menu of expensive, actively managed mutual funds
(which, in Hecker, contained more than two thousand funds), participant
direction allows her to deviate far from the optimal frontier of investment
portfolios recommended by trust investment law. For example, even if a
401(k) plan offers a few low-cost index funds, if it also includes high-cost,
actively managed, sector-specific funds, it enables participants to create
portfolios that contain large amounts of specific risk, violating a
fundamental principle of the Restatement.198 Although these active funds
may be riskier than index funds, in the sense that there is greater variance
in the distribution of their expected returns, this higher risk is not justified
by higher return expectations (because it is specific risk that could be
diversified away), and so participants could obtain better risk-return
combinations by investing in index funds.
While assembling undiversified portfolios made up of expensive
active funds may not be a wise investment strategy, in the abstract it does
not violate any particular legal principles. Doing so in the context of a trust

196. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 90 cmt. e(1) (2007) (“Decisions concerning a
prudent or suitable level of market risk for a particular trust can be reached only after
thoughtful consideration of its purposes and all of the relevant trust and beneficiary
circumstances.”).
197. These portfolios are constructed by buying the market portfolio and combining it
either with risk-free assets (to reduce risk) or with borrowing (to increase risk).
198. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 90 cmt. h (2007) (“Diversification is a
common theme of modern investment concepts, and it ordinarily applies at all different
levels of risk-return preference.”) (citations omitted).
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and, in particular, a pension plan that is dedicated to providing retirement
income and governed by a statute that places demanding fiduciary duties on
plan administrators, does raise issues. A trustee begins with an obligation
to diversify the trust’s assets so far as practical in order to maximize
expected returns for any level of risk, and to do so at a reasonable cost. If
the trustee gives participants control over their individual accounts, that
fundamental obligation does not go away. Allowing each participant to
determine and act on her own risk tolerance is consistent with trust
investment law; allowing her to bet her account on the roulette wheel is
not, nor are other investment strategies that violate the basic principles of
diversification and avoiding unreasonable costs.
In addition, even if there might be good reasons for an individual to
invest in active funds, giving any plan participant the option of buying
actively managed funds constitutes an improper delegation of investment
authority, since the plan sponsor cannot assume that every employee has
the expertise necessary to choose among those funds. While modern trust
law recognizes the need for delegation, that delegation must itself be
prudent,199 and the trustee must take into account “the knowledge, skill,
facilities, and compensation of both the trustee and the prospective
agents.”200 Given that a participant-directed plan may delegate important
decisions to thousands of people, it would be dangerous to assume that
every one of them possesses the capabilities required to invest prudently.
Even if an individual employee may not perfectly assess her own financial
situation in deciding how much risk to take on, she can plausibly do a
better job than the plan trustee could do for her. But there is no reason to
believe that the typical employee will be able to pick out the few actively
managed mutual funds that can be expected to beat the market.
To be consistent with trust investment law and with ERISA, then,
participant direction-the delegation of investment decisions to plan
participants-in employer pension plans should be limited to allowing each
participant to select the level of risk and expected return appropriate to her
circumstances. This could be done by offering a set of low-cost index
funds covering the major market segments and allowing participants to
decide how to allocate their accounts across those funds.201 Plan fiduciaries
that give participants the ability to spend more money (in the form of

199. Id. § 90 cmt. j (“In deciding what as well as whether to delegate and in selecting,
instructing, and supervising or monitoring agents, the trustee has a duty to the beneficiaries
to act as a prudent investor would act under the circumstances.”).
200. Id.
201. Alternatively, the plan could offer a single, “balanced” index fund-approximating
the performance of all of the global securities markets aggregated together-alongside an
option to invest in short-term Treasury bills.
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higher fund expenses) on less-diversified mutual funds with lower expected
returns should be prepared to explain themselves in court.
D. The Current Safe Harbor
But wait: What about section 404(c) and the exemption from liability
for losses caused by a participant’s investment decisions? The section
404(c) regulations say that a plan need only provide at least three
diversified investment alternatives (which do not have to be index funds)
that together make possible a wide range of risk-return choices; beyond
that, plans can include any other investments. If the investment options
included in a plan together comply with the regulations,202 various courts
have held that any duty to select those options prudently is either satisfied
or, in the alternative, unenforceable by plan participants.203
But this is not what ERISA actually says. Section 404(c) authorizes
the Department of Labor to determine the meaning of the phrase, “if a
participant or beneficiary exercises control over the assets in his
account.”204 Even if that condition is met, however, the safe harbor only
applies to losses that “result[] from such participant’s or beneficiary’s
exercise of control . . . .”205 The key question in any case is whether a
participant’s losses are caused by her exercise of control or by some other
factor for which plan fiduciaries may remain liable.
The plain meaning of “exercise of control” extends only to the actual
investment decisions made by the participant. Assume, for example, that a
plan offers a stock index fund and a bond index fund, a participant puts all
of her money in the stock index fund, and the stock market loses fifty

202. On close examination, a plan that only includes actively managed mutual funds
may not even comply with the regulations. According to the regulations, a plan must offer
“at least three investment alternatives” that must “in the aggregate enable the participant or
beneficiary by choosing among them to achieve a portfolio with aggregate risk and return
characteristics at any point within the range normally appropriate for the participant or
beneficiary . . . .” 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404c-1(b)(3)(i)(B)(3). Three different, diversified
active funds would allow participants to construct portfolios having different aggregate risk
and return characteristics. But arguably none of these portfolios are “within the range
normally appropriate for the participant or beneficiary,” at least not according to modern
trust investment law, for which a risk-return combination is only appropriate if it minimizes
risk for that level of expected return. Even if this is correct, however, the specific
requirements of paragraph (b)(3)(i)(B) do not apply to all investment alternatives, but only
to the three or more necessary to comply with that paragraph, and therefore a plan that uses
index funds to clear that hurdle could also include any number of expensive, actively
managed funds.
203. See supra Part B.
204. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(c)(1)(A) (2006).
205. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(c)(1)(A)(ii) (2006).
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percent of its value (as happened in the panic of 2008–09): Then, the
participant’s losses clearly result from her “exercise of control” and the
plan fiduciaries should not be liable for those losses.206 By contrast,
assume that a plan includes at least three index funds that together satisfy
the “broad range” requirement, but that these funds charge expense ratios
of two percentage points, rather than the ten to twenty basis points charged
by similar funds. Decades later, a participant could argue that her lower
account value due to those higher fees constitutes a loss. If the court agrees
that it is a loss, then it was clearly caused by the plan fiduciaries’ poor
selection of investment options and not by her own exercise of control.207
Under the wording of the statute, such a loss should be charged to the plan
fiduciaries, despite the fact that the plan’s investment options fit within the
Department’s regulations.
In other words, fiduciaries are not liable for the consequences of
participant choices among investment alternatives, but they remain liable
for losses that result from their selection of those investment alternatives in
the first place. This is the position that the Department of Labor took in
issuing its final regulation:
“[T]he act of designating investment
alternatives . . . in an ERISA section 404(c) plan is a fiduciary function to
which the limitation on liability provided by section 404(c) is not
applicable.”208 So in selecting investment options, plan fiduciaries remain
bound by the duties of loyalty, care, and diversification209 and are also
barred from paying more than “reasonable compensation” for services.210
In most interesting cases, the participant’s losses will be due to both
investment selection by plan fiduciaries and exercise of control by the
206. The participant might argue that her losses resulted from the existence of the stock
fund as an alternative and that the plan should only have offered the bond fund, but such a
limited set of options would violate not only the “broad range” requirement, but also the
basic principles of trust investment law.
207. For a similar example, see Angela Hayden Magary, Pitfalls of an ERISA 404(c)
DefenseEmployers’ Potential Liability for Employee-Directed Retirement Plans, 11.2
PIABA B.J. 59, 64 (2004).
208. Final Regulation Regarding Participant Directed Individual Account Plans (ERISA
Section 404(c) Plans), 57 Fed. Reg. 46922 (Oct. 13, 1992); see also Paul J. Donahue, Plan
Sponsor Fiduciary Duty for the Selection of Options in Participant-Directed Defined
Contribution Plans and the Choice between Stable Value and Money Market, 39 AKRON L.
REV. 9, 15–17 (2006) (citing the preamble to the Final Regulations and the Department’s
amicus brief in the Enron litigation in which the Department reiterated its view that
fiduciaries cannot escape their obligation to prudently select investment options).
209. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a) (2006).
210. 29 U.S.C. § 1108(b)(2) (2006). 29 U.S.C. § 1106(a)(1) prohibits transactions
between a plan and a “party in interest,” which is defined by section 1002(14) to include a
person who provides services to a plan; and section 1108(b)(2) provides an exemption to
section 1106 for “reasonable arrangements with a party in interest” for necessary services,
“if no more than reasonable compensation is paid therefor.” Id. § 1108.
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participant. In In re Unisys Savings Plan Litigation, the plaintiffs lost
money they had invested in guaranteed investment contracts issued by an
insurance company that later collapsed.211 Unisys, the plan sponsor, argued
that even if the inclusion of that investment alternative was imprudent, plan
fiduciaries were shielded from liability by section 404(c) because the
plaintiffs’ losses resulted from their “informed choice” to invest in that
alternative.212 The Third Circuit agreed in principle with Unisys:
[A] fiduciary may call upon section 1104(c)’s protection where a
causal nexus between a participant’s or a beneficiary’s exercise
of control and the claimed loss is demonstrated. This requisite
causal connection is, in our view, established with proof that a
participant’s or a beneficiary’s control was a cause-in-fact, as
well as a substantial contributing factor in bringing about the loss
incurred.213
In general, if a plan offers some good investment options and some
bad ones, even if the inclusion of the bad ones constitutes a fiduciary
breach, a participant’s decision to invest in one or more of the bad ones will
easily qualify as both a cause-in-fact of and a substantial contributing factor
to the loss, and the plan fiduciaries will not face liability.214
Either Unisys is wrong or its implications are absurd. Assume that a
plan includes diversified investment options that together satisfy the “broad
range” requirement but also allows participants to place their money on
zero on the roulette wheel (and discloses that playing roulette is risky). If a
participant does the latter and loses her entire account, her losses result
from both her own rashness and the plan sponsor’s blatant irresponsibility,
yet the Unisys standard would absolve the sponsor of liability. It is

211. In re Unisys Savs. Plan Litig., 74 F.3d 420, 425 (3d Cir. 1996).
212. Id. at 444–45.
213. Id. at 445. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(c) (2006) is the codified version of ERISA § 404(c).
However, the court reversed the district court’s grant of summary judgment to Unisys on the
grounds that Unisys had not proven that it had provided sufficient information to plan
participants to give them effective control. Assuming sufficient disclosure, the inclusion of
the guaranteed investment contracts would not have prevented Unisys from invoking section
404(c).
214. On Unisys, see Stabile, supra note 60, at 377–78 (explaining that the Unisys
decision excuses a fiduciary from liability when there is a causal relationship between the
participant’s exercise of control and the loss). But see Donahue, supra note 208, at 15–16
n.34 (calling Stabile’s reading of Unisys “flawed” and arguing that it is possible to hold a
fiduciary liable when a participant’s losses result from his or her selection). Donahue
claims that Unisys “actually supports the assertion that damages from the Plan Sponsor can
be obtained as a result of option selection decisions,” but the passage he quotes states that
liability could arise “if the Plans did not offer an acceptable alternative to GIC investments.”
Id. By implication, if they did offer an acceptable alternative, the plan fiduciaries would be
shielded from liability.
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difficult to imagine that Congress intended to protect plan fiduciaries in
cases where their own imprudence was a major and avoidable cause of
participant losses.
Unisys was based on events that occurred before the current
regulations were issued. Several courts have since deferred to the
Department of Labor’s position that the selection of investment options is
itself subject to fiduciary duties, including the Fourth Circuit in DiFelice v.
U.S. Airways, Inc.215 Recently, however, two other courts of appeals have
rejected the Department’s position. In Hecker, the Seventh Circuit held
that the safe harbor “does protect a fiduciary that satisfies the criteria of §
1104(c) and includes a sufficient range of options so that the participants
have control over the risk of loss.”216 The court essentially asserted that
any plan that complies with the regulations is shielded from claims of
fiduciary breach.217 The opinion quotes from the “broad range” criterion of
the regulations, then describes how the plan in question met that
requirement, and concludes: “If particular participants lost money or did
not earn as much as they would have liked, that disappointing outcome was
attributable to their individual choices.”218 In short, if a plan provides
sufficient choice, as defined by the regulations, its fiduciaries are not liable
if participants invest in the bad funds. This argument, however, does not
seriously address the Department of Labor’s position that imprudent fund
selection remains a fiduciary breach, even if the resulting investment menu
technically complies with the regulations. Instead, Hecker asserts that
complying with the regulations and giving participants “control over the
risk of loss” is enough to earn a complete exemption from liability.219
In Langbecker v. Electronic Data Systems Corp., the Fifth Circuit
rejected the Department’s position on different grounds.220 The court
argued that the Department’s position was an unreasonable interpretation of
section 404(c) because it “would render the § 404(c) defense applicable
only where plan managers breached no fiduciary duty, and thus only where

215. 497 F.3d 410, 418 n.3 (4th Cir. 2007); see, e.g., Kanawi v. Bechtel Corp., 590 F.
Supp. 2d 1213, 1232 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (accepting the Department of Labor’s position that a
fiduciary has a “continuing duty to monitor the prudence of investment options in a plan
regardless of the scope of a participant’s control”); Bendaoud v. Hodgson, 578 F. Supp. 2d
257, 271 (D. Mass. 2008) (asserting that fiduciaries can be liable for providing unwise
investment choices even if plan participants direct their own investments).
216. 556 F.3d 575, 589 (7th Cir. 2009). 29 U.S.C. § 1104(c) is the codified version of
ERISA § 404(c).
217. Id. at 589–90.
218. Id. at 590.
219. Id. at 589.
220. 476 F.3d 299, 311 (5th Cir. 2007).
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it is unnecessary.”221 In other words, if a plan can comply with the “broad
range” requirement, yet its fiduciaries can still be liable for imprudent
selection of investment options, then that component of the regulations
might as well not exist. Put another way, if a plan fiduciary can
demonstrate prudence in its choice of investment options, then it has
already met its fiduciary duties, and whether it complies with the
regulations is irrelevant.
The court in Langbecker has a valid point, but it is ultimately too cute.
The point is that the current regulations are not very helpful. They show
employers how to fulfill the statutory requirement that participants be
permitted to exercise control over their accounts, which shields them from
liability for losses resulting from participant investment decisions. But
compliance with the regulations does not provide an automatic exemption
from liability for imprudent selection of investment options. From an
employer’s perspective, this safe harbor is deeply flawed, since complying
with the details of the regulations still does not provide watertight
protection from lawsuits.
Even if the safe harbor is flawed, however, that does not authorize
courts to change the meaning of the statute. The statute still exempts plan
fiduciaries only for losses resulting from the participant’s “exercise of
control,” which plainly does not encompass the prior selection of
investment alternatives. If plan sponsors and administrators are excused
from their fiduciary duties whenever a participant’s investment choices
played some role in causing her losses, as in Unisys, the simple,
predictable, and all-too-frequent fact of poor individual decision-making
would absolve fiduciaries of even the most blatantly irresponsible and
indefensible decisions. This seems incompatible with the basic principles
of trust law, which require trustees to be loyal to the interests of their
beneficiaries, and with ERISA’s fiduciary duty structure, which demands
care, skill, and prudence from plan sponsors and administrators. Such a
powerful get-out-of-jail-free card would also undermine a statute designed
to protect employee retirement savings from unscrupulous or incompetent
employers.
For these reasons, simply complying with the letter of the Department
of Labor’s regulations—for example, by offering three dissimilar,
diversified mutual funds—is not enough to escape trust investment law’s
presumption in favor of indexing and against active management. A plan
may comply with the “broad range” requirement of the regulations, but if it
enables participants to create suboptimal portfolios that a trustee would not
be allowed to invest in, it violates the duties of diversification, avoiding
221. Id.
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unreasonable costs, and prudent delegation. This does not automatically
mean that any plan that includes active funds represents a breach of
fiduciary duty. It only means that, to defend against a claim of breach, the
plan sponsor and administrator have to explain why the inclusion of those
funds was consistent with their fiduciary duties. Given the empirical
evidence against active fund management, however, this may be a difficult
case to make.
E. A Better Safe Harbor
My previous argument that employers remain liable for imprudent
fund selection, despite section 404(c) and its enabling regulations, has two
practical shortcomings. First, while it is quite plausible that some courts
will agree with the Department of Labor that the section 404(c) exemption
does not apply to the selection of investment alternatives, it is unlikely that
they will suddenly rule that actively managed mutual funds are imprudent
and that including such funds in a pension plan constitutes a breach of
fiduciary duty; such a ruling would immediately expose the fiduciaries of
thousands of 401(k) plans to potential liability for the losses suffered by
their participants. Second, it leaves employers in limbo, unable to rely on
the existing regulations and unsure how to protect themselves from liability
for imprudent fund selection.
For these reasons, a better and more realistic solution is for the
Department of Labor to modify the section 404(c) regulations, as it is
authorized to do by the statute.222 To be useful, a safe harbor should define,
as clearly as possible, those objective conditions that, if met, will shield a
party from liability. In this case, it should be narrower (covering fewer
plans), but safer (minimizing the chances that those plans might create
liability).
The current section 404(c) regulations are too broad because they
encompass pension plans that contravene the principles of trust investing
and therefore violate ERISA’s fiduciary duties. Instead, to provide a
meaningful safe harbor, the regulations should only permit plans with
investment menus that are consistent with trust law and ERISA, interpreted
conservatively (from the fiduciary’s point of view)–that is, the definition of
a “broad range of investment alternatives” should exclude plans that
plausibly constitute a violation of fiduciary duties. Then employers could
be confident that they were not only complying with the Department of

222. The section 404(c) exemption from liability applies “if a participant or beneficiary
exercises control over the assets in his account (as determined under regulations of the
Secretary).” 29 U.S.C. § 1104(c)(1)(A) (2006).

KWAK - FINALIZED (DO NOT DELETE)

530

U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW

3/3/2013 1:09 PM

[Vol. 15:2

Labor’s definition of “exercise of control” but also satisfying the
underlying fiduciary duty to select investment alternatives prudently.
As argued above, the only investment strategy that unequivocally
complies with trust investment law is to diversify away specific risk as
much as possible at the lowest cost possible. This means that for assets
traded in liquid, efficient markets, trustees should invest solely through
low-cost index funds, where those funds are available. Although pension
plan participants should be allowed to make asset allocation decisions that
reflect their risk preferences, within each asset class they should invest in
low-cost index funds wherever possible. Therefore, the “broad range”
component of the section 404(c) regulations should be limited to plans that
only include low-cost index funds,223 each covering a major segment of the
securities markets—such as U.S. stocks, international (non-U.S. stocks),
U.S. bonds, Treasury bonds, or Treasury inflation-indexed bonds—as well
as a money market fund or similar low-risk investment option. A plan
could not include additional investment options beyond those specified by
the regulations, and therefore could not include less diversified, more
expensive, actively managed funds.224
This proposal may seem like a return to the restrictive “legal lists” of
investments that trustees were allowed to invest in, which were used in
some jurisdictions into the early twentieth century.225 But the proposal
concerns a safe harbor, not an exclusive list. Just as the Restatement says
that active management may be suitable under certain circumstances, it
may be prudent for a plan to include active funds, especially in asset
classes where low-cost index funds are not available. But trust law
establishes a presumption against such investments: Recall that their
“added costs and risks must be justified by realistically evaluated return
expectations.”226 Therefore, actively managed funds should not receive the
automatic protection of the regulatory safe harbor.
Such a narrowly drawn safe harbor will motivate most employers to
conform their plans to its requirements. This will have two salutary policy

223. Index funds that attempt to follow the same indexes have varying expenses and
varying levels of tracking error—the difference between the fund’s gross returns and the
actual returns of the index itself. Exchange-traded funds that track particular indexes may
also have advantages over traditional index mutual funds. Determining exactly what
investment options qualify as “low-cost index funds” for the purposes of the regulations is
beyond the scope of this Article.
224. Ideally, the regulatory safe harbor would exclude plans that include company stock
as an investment option. An argument might be made, however, that ERISA’s exemption of
company stock from its general diversification requirement implies that such plans are
eligible for safe harbor. See 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(2) (2006).
225. Langbein, supra note 122, at 643–44.
226. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 90 cmt. h(2) (2007).
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effects. First, it will improve plan participants’ investment outcomes by
reducing the amount of their assets that is drained away by fund
management fees (saving them on the order of fifteen billion dollars each
year)227 and by steering them away from less diversified investment options
that are likely to underperform the market, even before taking fees into
account. With a restricted set of investment options, participants are more
likely to invest on the efficient risk-return spectrum and more likely to
consider where they should be on that spectrum.
Second, this reshaping of pension plans could have spillover effects on
the mutual fund market as a whole. Defined contribution plans are a major
source of demand for mutual funds, with $2.5 trillion out of the total $11.8
trillion invested in U.S. mutual funds, and shifting that money into low-cost
index funds will itself significantly lower the industry’s weighted average
expense ratio. In addition, many people’s introduction to investing is
through 401(k) plans: Of households that first purchased mutual funds
between 2005 and 2010, seventy-two percent were introduced to mutual
funds by their employer-sponsored retirement plans.228 Since the simplest
way to continue investing one’s plan balance after leaving a company is to
convert it into an IRA with the same fund company, investing patterns set
in a defined contribution plan persist, at least to some extent, into
individual investing. Therefore, a policy change that shifts assets in
employer pension plans from active funds to index funds is likely to cause
a similar shift in IRAs, potentially doing far more than section 36(b) of the
1940 Act to solve the problem of high fund fees.
While narrowing the section 404(c) safe harbor offers employees
227. The weighted average expense ratio for stock mutual funds in 401(k) plans was 74
basis points in 2009. INV. CO. INST., supra note 6, at 110. A reduction in the average
expense ratio by 60 basis points on $2.5 trillion in assets would reduce aggregate fees by
$15 billion. This estimate excludes the higher transaction costs of active funds, which are
not reflected in their expense ratios. It is theoretically possible that a major shift from active
funds in index funds could cause those index funds to become more expensive. This
assumes that low-cost index funds currently serve as loss leaders that are cross-subsidized
by high-cost active funds, which is a possible equilibrium in a market with sophisticated and
unsophisticated consumers. See Xavier Gabaix & David Laibson, Shrouded Attributes,
Consumer Myopia, and Information Suppression in Competitive Markets, 121 Q.J. ECON.
505 (2006) (demonstrating that informational shrouding is present even in highly
competitive markets). Even in this case, there should still be a large reduction in aggregate
fees because index funds have lower costs than active funds. It is also not clear that the
cheapest index funds are being sold as loss leaders. The Vanguard 500 Index Fund, for
example, has an expense ratio as low as 6 basis points, but it also has more than $100 billion
under management, providing more than $60 million in annual revenues to cover its costs.
Vanguard Fund Profile: Vanguard 500 Index Fund Admiral Shares, VANGUARD GROUP,
INC.,
https://personal.vanguard.com/us/funds/snapshot?FundId=0540&FundIntExt=INT
(last visited Feb. 1, 2013).
228. INV. CO. INST., supra note 6, at 85.
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enhanced protection for their benefits, it does not discourage employers
from offering pension plans. The two major reasons why an employer
would not offer a pension plan are administrative cost and litigation risk. A
plan including a handful of index funds is no more expensive to administer
than a plan including a large menu of actively managed funds. More likely,
every large fund family would create an off-the-shelf plan that meets the
requirements of the safe harbor, and since the plans would be substantively
similar, they would be likely to compete on price. More importantly, this
narrower safe harbor should reduce litigation risk for employers and plan
fiduciaries. Because the safe harbor is defined to encompass only plans
that are consistent with the principles of trust investment law and ERISA,
the fact that a plan fits within the safe harbor should imply that its
investment alternatives were selected prudently. This could only reduce
liability risk from the current state of affairs where a plan fiduciary must
first ensure that the plan’s investment options comply with the many details
of the “broad range” requirement, and then might still be liable for
participant losses.
There is a more modest alternative that could still have a significant
impact on plan participants’ investments and hence the security of their
retirement savings. Instead of restricting the safe harbor to plans that only
offer low-cost index funds, the regulations could grant protection to plans
that make low-cost indexing the default allocation of participant
investments; that is, money contributed to employees’ accounts would be
invested in one or more index funds unless the employee affirmatively
opted for a different investment strategy. The general idea of using default
options to increase retirement savings has received considerable attention
recently. This type of approach has proven attractive to many legal
scholars because it preserves individuals’ freedom of choice while
encouraging them to make choices that are in their own interests.229 The
best-known example is automatically enrolling new employees in 401(k)
plans unless they opt out, which results in much higher participation rates
than if employees are not enrolled by default.230 Default options also have
229. In many cases, the people making these choices recognize that they are acting in
their own interests. RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING
DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS (2008) (demonstrating how to
structure social policies to encourage individuals to make what they themselves consider the
best decisions).
230. See THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 229, at 103–17 (summarizing retirement
savings behavior and default options); John Beshears et al., The Importance of Default
Options for Retirement Savings Outcomes: Evidence from the United States, in SOCIAL
SECURITY POLICY IN A CHANGING ENVIRONMENT 167 (Jeffrey Brown et al. eds., 2009)
(examining empirical evidence to conclude that defaults strongly impact savings outcomes);
James J. Choi et al., For Better or For Worse: Default Effects and 401(k) Savings Behavior,
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a significant effect on the amount of money that plan participants put
aside231 and on how participants allocate their money among various
investment options.232
The Department of Labor could modify its regulations to require a
default allocation to one or more low-cost index funds for any plan seeking
to benefit from the section 404(c) safe harbor. Under these rules,
employees could still affirmatively choose to move their money to other
investment options. Since defaults seem to be at least somewhat “sticky,”
this would probably increase the amount of retirement plan money invested
in low-cost index funds. There are at least two reasons why it is far from a
perfect solution, however. First, default asset allocations seem to be less
sticky than default participation. At one company where employees were
automatically enrolled in a 401(k) plan with a default allocation, fewer than
half of them had all of their money in the default fund after fifteen to
twenty-four months.233 In this case, the default allocation was to a money
market fund (with very low returns), which could explain why so many
people shifted away from it. More generally, however, most people agree
in principle that they should be saving for retirement, so relatively few opt
out of a plan with automatic enrollment; there is less popular consensus
about particular investment strategies, so we would expect more people to
opt out of the default allocation. Second, once employees have enrolled in
a 401(k) plan, it is not in anyone’s interests for them to opt out. By
contrast, if employees are being defaulted into low-cost index funds, it is in
the interests of the companies that offer the other available funds—or even
of the plan administrator itself, which is often a mutual fund company—to
convince them to switch into higher-cost funds. We can expect those fund
companies to actively market their higher-cost funds to participants,
reducing the stickiness of the default option and eroding the share of
investments allocated to index funds.
Whether the safe harbor excludes plans that offer active funds or is
simply restricted to funds that make index funds the default investment
option, employees would benefit from lower investment costs and higher
in PERSPECTIVES IN THE ECONOMICS OF AGING 81 (David Wise ed., 2004) (finding that
automatic enrollment increases 401(k) participation and that a majority of new plan
participants save at the default contribution rate); Brigitte C. Madrian & Dennis F. Shea,
The Power of Suggestion: Inertia in 401(k) Participation and Savings Behavior, 116 Q.J.
ECON. 1149 (2001) (finding that 401(k) participation is higher with automatic enrollment
and that a substantial share of those who enroll under automatic enrollment retain the default
fund allocation and contribution rate).
231. Beshears et al., supra note 230, at 173–75.
232. Beshears et al., supra note 230, at 175–76.
233. Beshears et al., supra note 230, at 175 (examining employees who were hired after
automatic enrollment began).
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expected net returns, while employers would benefit from lower litigation
risk. The big loser, of course, would be the asset management industry.
Fund companies would no longer be able to pocket one percent of their
customers’ assets every year for providing products that, on average and in
the aggregate, underperform the market. But that is precisely the point.
IV. POLICY GOALS AND DOCTRINAL CONSTRAINTS
This Article makes a legal argument to achieve a public policy goal.
As such, it faces at least two serious issues. First, even if the policy goal is
desirable, is it absolutely required by current law, or are there other
interpretations of trust investment law and ERISA that dictate a different
outcome? And second, what should we do about parts of the overall
retirement savings landscape where the same policy goal applies but the
legal argument is not available, such as IRAs?
A. Trust Law, the Restatement, and Department of Labor Regulations
The central doctrinal argument of this Article—that contemporary
trust investment law contains a presumption against active investment
management, at least for asset categories where low-cost indexing is
feasible—rests heavily on the Restatement (Third) of Trusts, especially its
comments. A Restatement, however, is not the law, but merely an
authority of indeterminate persuasiveness. In addition, despite the
comments to the Restatement that discuss the merits of passive investing,
the common law of trusts has not recognized a duty to index.234 Nor does it
seem likely that the law will independently evolve in that direction. In the
wake of the recent financial crisis, the strong form of the efficient markets
hypothesis (which holds that market prices always incorporate all relevant
information, private or public) has been widely left for dead; the influence
of modern portfolio theory (the conceptual underpinning to the prudent
investor rule as expressed in the Restatement) may well have passed its
peak. In this context, one particular reading of the Restatement may seem
too fragile a foundation for a significant change in the law governing
defined contribution pensions.
I am not arguing for a blanket prohibition on active investing by
trustees—only for the presumption against active funds that is already
implied by the comments to the Restatement. I do not expect that courts

234. See, e.g., CHARLES E. ROUNDS, JR. & CHARLES E. ROUNDS, III, LORING AND
ROUNDS: A TRUSTEE’S HANDBOOK § 6.2.2.1, at 488–93 (2009) (discussing arguments for
and against indexing in general and for trusts).
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would use that presumption to immediately find that any trustee who has
invested in active funds has breached her fiduciary duties. Instead, they
should use it to ask trustees to explain their conduct in light of the
principles of the Restatement.235 For example, a trustee who delegates
investment responsibility to a fund manager need only explain why that
manager “possesses or has access to the competence necessary to carry out
the [investment] program”;236 a trustee who can give a reasonable response
to that question is unlikely to have breached her fiduciary duty. The
Restatement recognizes that each trustee must take into account the
particular circumstances of the trust and its beneficiaries, providing ample
latitude for trustees to adopt appropriate investment strategies.
This flexibility afforded to individual trustees is less applicable to the
world of defined contribution pension plans, all of which have the same
objective (retirement saving) and each of which is responsible for large
numbers of employees in differing financial circumstances. These factors
imply that there should be less tolerance for investment strategies that take
on risk that could be diversified away and incur expenses that could be
avoided. Even so, this Article argues only for a presumption: Plan
sponsors would still have the opportunity to explain why they chose to
offer active funds in their pension plans. A fiduciary who could provide
convincing evidence of why she believed, after a reasonable investigation,
that a particular active fund promised net expected returns higher than
those of an index fund would be unlikely to face liability.
Finally, my recommended solution is a regulatory change by the
Department of Labor, not a sudden change in the way that courts interpret
trust investment law. The fundamental reason why the Department should
make that change is not simply that it is dictated by the Restatement of
Trusts, but that it is good policy: Encouraging companies to shift their
401(k) plan offerings from active funds to low-cost index funds will, in the
aggregate, reduce the fees paid by plan participants and increase the
amount of money eventually available to them in retirement. This Article
shows that changing the section 404(c) regulations to favor index funds is,
at the very least, consistent with a plausible reading of trust law and
ERISA, even if other readings are possible. In other words, the
interpretation presented here provides the doctrinal support necessary for
the Department to make a regulatory change that is desirable on policy
grounds—which, in the end, is what matters to ordinary Americans.

235. See Meyer v. Berkshire Life Co., 250 F. Supp. 2d 544, 566 (D. Md. 2003) (asking
defendants to explain their conduct in light of modern portfolio theory).
236. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 90 cmt. h(2) (2007).
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B. Other Retirement Savings Vehicles
The proposals of this Article only address one component of the
American retirement savings system:
employer-sponsored defined
contribution plans. As described above, in addition to the $2.5 trillion
invested in mutual funds through such plans, another $2.2 trillion is
invested in mutual funds through the various types of individual retirement
accounts. The policy arguments against active funds in 401(k) plans apply
equally well against active funds in IRAs. Why not change the rules for
IRAs as well? And why stop there? Why not change the rules for all
mutual funds?
The short answer is that the legal basis for the policy change
recommended in this Article does not apply to IRAs. My argument is
based on trust investment law as made applicable to employer-sponsored
pension plans through ERISA. ERISA does not apply to IRAs, and there is
no equivalent to section 404(c) and its enabling regulations that sets
substantive criteria for IRA investments.237 Banning active funds or
otherwise restricting the types of investments that can be made in an IRA
would require a new statute.
There is also a more interesting substantive difference between
employer-sponsored pension plans and IRAs. An IRA provides a more
direct relationship between the investor and the asset management industry
than does a pension plan. An individual can open an IRA directly with an
asset management company, a bank, or another financial intermediary. The
intermediary can decide what investment options are available, but in some
cases this includes virtually the entire universe of individual securities,
mutual funds, and exchange-traded funds.238 Since an individual can
choose any intermediary for her IRA, this means that she has an essentially
unrestricted choice of investment alternatives. Contrast this with an
employer-sponsored pension plan, where the plan sponsor determines what
investments the employee can make and on what terms.
One could argue that IRA investors are more vulnerable than pension
plan participants because they are dealing directly with the asset
management industry, without the expert protection provided by

237. An IRA can include almost any type of investment, with the exception of
collectibles (artworks, antiques, etc.). Retirement Plans FAQs Regarding IRAs, INTERNAL
REVENUE SERV., http://www.irs.gov/Retirement-Plans/Retirement-Plans-FAQs-regardingIRAs (last visited Feb. 1, 2013).
238. Fidelity, for example, allows IRA investments in “Fidelity and non-Fidelity funds,
stocks, bonds/U.S. Treasuries, FDIC-insured CDs, annuities, and ETFs.” Choosing
Investments for Your IRA, FIDELITY INVS., https://www.fidelity.com/retirement/learn-aboutiras/choosing-investments (last visited Feb. 1, 2013).

KWAK - FINALIZED (DO NOT DELETE)

2013]

IMPROVING RETIREMENT SAVINGS

3/3/2013 1:09 PM

537

sophisticated employers. This argument, however, is premised on the
assumption that those sophisticated employers are actually doing a good
job of looking out for employee interests, which is currently not the case.
Instead, in a practical sense, many plan participants are worse off than IRA
investors, who at least have the opportunity (whether or not they take it) to
seek out low-cost index funds for their retirement savings.
The problem with employer-sponsored pensions is the failure of plan
sponsors to live up to their fiduciary duties. This is precisely the kind of
problem that trust law and ERISA are intended to solve. Fiduciary duties
are typically imposed in situations where one party is vulnerable to another
party, whether through asymmetric information, unequal bargaining power,
or some other imbalance that cannot be redressed directly. With pension
plans, employees cannot access the free market directly and are dependent
on their employers to negotiate for them, yet those employers are not
complying with their existing fiduciary duties. This Article simply
proposes to enforce those duties.
By contrast, the problem with IRAs is one not of negligent fiduciaries
but of market failure. Since consumers effectively have access to the entire
market, the legal response, if any, should be to increase consumer
protection, not to enforce fiduciary duties. The traditional mechanisms for
consumer protection, as discussed above, are product regulation and
disclosure. Given the known failings of disclosure in the context of
financial products, perhaps the best solution from a policy standpoint
would be to exclude active funds from IRAs. But this would be a
particularly draconian solution. It would have to be a categorical ban.
There is no practical way to create a presumption against active funds
because IRA custodians do not play the investment-selection role played by
pension plan administrators. To be coherent, it would have to extend to
investments in individual securities as well, since they are, by definition,
much less diversified than the typical active fund. And because this policy
would restrict individual choice in a free (although tax-preferred) market—
as opposed to restricting the choices of plan sponsors with fiduciary
responsibilities to participants—it has to be balanced against the value of
individual autonomy. Although I believe that restrictions on IRA
investments would make ordinary investors, in the aggregate, better off,239

239. One concern raised occasionally is that if everyone were to invest in index funds,
no one would try to pick stocks anymore, so the market would lose the ability to set prices.
See, e.g., Rounds & Rounds, supra note 234, § 6.2.2.1, at 491. Even if active funds were
barred from employer-sponsored pension plans and from IRAs, however, many people
would continue to pick stocks, including hedge fund managers, defined benefit pension
funds, active fund managers (investing funds from people’s non-retirement accounts), and
individuals (in their own non-retirement accounts).
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the legal case for it is ultimately more difficult to make.
What this discussion reveals, perhaps more than anything else, is the
fragmented, patchwork nature of our retirement system and the laws that
define it. This Article has argued that ERISA can be used to give
employees better investment options and increase their retirement security.
It is still true, however, that substantive changes to the world of defined
contribution pensions have to be fit through a statutory window designed
for a defined benefit world that is slowly fading into history—and once
people leave their employers and roll over their account balances into
IRAs, they enter a new world with its own legal rules. What we really need
is a new, comprehensive legal structure for retirement savings, which could
even be integrated with Social Security. But that is a subject for another
time.
CONCLUSION
The retirement security of ordinary American workers has been a
major concern of public policy since at least the 1930s, when it led to the
establishment of Social Security. In the United States, however, insuring
workers against destitution in their old age has never been left solely to the
federal government. Instead, from the 1930s through the 1950s, the federal
government and the private sector, through both collaboration and conflict,
established a system of both public and private retirement benefits.
Generally speaking, business leaders were opposed to the complete
federalization of retirement insurance (and the higher payroll taxes it would
entail), both because they opposed government expansion and because they
used pension plans to pursue private ends—notably, attracting workers and
later inducing them to retire. They favored employer-provided pensions as
a complement to Social Security and as an alternative to the further
expansion of Social Security.
Both the federal government and the business community got
something out of this grand bargain, which was worked out in rough
fashion over the decades. The government provided tax benefits to private
employers in order to increase coverage of workers by private pension
plans. In exchange for the tax benefits, the assets in those plans had to be
held in trust for their participants and beneficiaries. The expansion of
private pensions also relieved the federal government of some of the
responsibility for supporting the elderly, albeit in a haphazard fashion,
since not all workers have access to pensions. Finally, the passage of
ERISA in 1974 imposed sweeping regulation on private pension plans,
confirming their public importance as a major pillar of America’s
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retirement system.240
Since 1974, employers have not kept up their end of the bargain. The
replacement of defined benefit plans by defined contribution plans has
shifted funding and investment risk from employers onto employees.241 As
a result, while most pension plans today offer a tax-advantaged way to save
for retirement, they do not provide retirement insurance in any meaningful
sense. The advantages for a company of shifting risk onto its employees
are so great and so obvious (and individual accounts are so attractive to
many people) that there is no way of going back to the world of defined
benefit plans, and there is nothing any reading of ERISA can do about that.
But participant-directed defined contribution plans are governed by ERISA,
and hence by its fiduciary duty provisions, themselves rooted in trust law.
The key question is what those provisions mean in the context of
participant direction. This Article has argued that ERISA does have
something important to say about such plans: The protection of section
404(c) should extend only to plans that, through the prudent selection of
investment alternatives, ensure that participant assets are invested in
conformity with the basic principles of trust law and sound investing. This
implies that the section 404(c) safe harbor is not available to plans that
include actively managed mutual funds; to make this clear, its
implementing regulations should be rewritten to exclude such plans.
Such a strong presumption against active fund management would be
difficult to maintain in the realm of ordinary investing, especially given the
current dominance of the paradigm of investor sovereignty. But this
presumption makes legal, political, and historical sense in the context of
pension plans, which are governed by ERISA in the name of retirement
security. Again, this interpretation of ERISA would not ensure retirement
security for plan participants; they would still need to save enough money
while working and not withdraw it prematurely, and they would still be
subject to investment risk. But for any level of expected return, they would
be subject to less investment risk, and they would lose significantly less
money due to fees along the way. This result is entirely consistent with the
basic purpose of ERISA’s regulation of pension plans (and of the tax
preferences granted to those plans): increasing the number of people who
enjoy a decent income in retirement. It is also consistent with the history of

240. See 29 U.S.C. § 1001 (2006) (“The Congress finds . . . that the continued wellbeing and security of millions of employees and their dependents are directly affected by
these [employee benefit] plans; that they are affected with a national public interest; that
they have become an important factor affecting the stability of employment and the
successful development of industrial relations . . . .”).
241. See JACOB S. HACKER, THE GREAT RISK SHIFT: THE NEW ECONOMIC INSECURITY
AND THE DECLINE OF THE AMERICAN DREAM 109–35 (2008).
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employer pension plans, which have always had the public purpose of
improving retirement security for ordinary Americans.

